The Locker

How to really lose friends and alienate people

2008-03-05T00:58:00.000-08:00

Say you're an atheist.

John Loftus - Rejecting Christianity

2008-01-19T19:07:00.000-08:00

"The Christian faith should be rejected by modern civilized scientifically literate people."

I'm not too familiar with John Loftus' writings. However, the above claim is one he advances at his blog, and I must disagree on several grounds.

If he wants to debate me on the matter, I don't think it would be a waste of time - although there may be more important matters for people to spend time debating.

How I interpret the statement

Loftus seems to be saying that all shades of Christian faith (where it differs from other beliefs) should be rejected. This is the problem. The Christian faith is very broad.

Some branches are quite modern.

Some branches are quite civilized.

Some branches are quite scientifically literate.

Loftus would make a better argument if he argued for rejecting the elements of the Christian faith that are different. He could argue for rejecting the aspects of Christianity that are ancient, uncivilized and incompatible with science.

The nature of "should"

My key disagreement with Loftus' statement regards his choice of the word "should." Since he has this phrase highlighted in red text in a permanent "challenge" section on his blog, I assume he did a lot of thinking when he chose his words. As I see it, there are two possible meanings.

First, there is a *practical* use of the word. If you want to win a game of chess, you *should* try to put your opponent's king in checkmate.

Second, there is a *moral* use of the word. If people want to be modern, civilized and scientifically literate (all "good" things), they should reject the Christian faith.

In a practical sense, Loftus would have to (and would inevitably fail, I believe) to establish that those aspiring to be modern, civilized and scientifically literate - in order to do so - must reject the Christian faith. This is evidently incorrect.

It should be noted - there are elements, some specific to the Christian faith, that should definitely be rejected by modern, civilized, scientifically literate people. Just not all.

We are left with the moral element. Loftus may be claiming that modern, civilized, scientifically literate people have a moral obligation to abandon Christianity. For simple reasons, I disagree. If people are modern, civilized and scientifically literate - and Christian - what moral reason is there for such people to reject their Christian faith? It clearly is not obstructing them. Such a claim would also imply that adherence to the Christian faith (and thus, all Christians) are either incapable of being modern, civilized and scientifically literate, or are severely lacking in those areas. This amounts to bigotry and is not to be tolerated.

Conclusion

Doubtless, Loftus wrote his challenge to instigate discussion with Christians. His view is probably shared by many people who have not considered the actual implications of that sort of claim. My post is simply to express my disagreement with his argument, pending clarification.

More about science/atheism

2008-01-16T00:41:00.000-08:00

This is a response to Rhology's comments here.

After Rhology's most recent post, I realized there are some very big elephants in the room. They should be brought to the forefront of my attention on this blog. Our conversation meandered a lot, so I will try to separate piles of topics.

Science and God:

At the outset, Rhology and I agreed that science - being a study of physical laws and theories explaining physical phenomena - cannot really talk about "God." Then Rhology complained that science "oversteps its bounds" in assuming that naturalistic explanations can account for everything. The theory of evolution is described as ad hoc and "desperate."

If science just concerns itself with physical phenomena, then seeking any explanations other than naturalistic ones would be overstepping boundaries. If even the possibility of a naturalistic explanation exists for phenomena, science should be expected to seek it - even to assume it exists.

Consider an example of a murder investigation. A theist might approach a particularly puzzling case and trumpet the folly of "assuming" a naturalistic explanation exists. His supernatural alternative - whatever it may be - can be made to seem much more simple and probable. There is a problem here, and I'll deal with it later when I discuss Occam's Razor.

Abiogenesis:

I made the claim that "In a broad range of possible early-earth conditions, amino acids have been observed to form in repeatable laboratory experiments."

As Rhology expected, I was referring to the original Miller-Urey experiments, and the subsequent research they spawned. He will find many answers to abiogenesis-related questions and criticisms that stem from the massive Creationism propaganda machines here.

His apparent skepticism toward the experiments may be answered (pardon the assumption) with this sort of response:

" Since his first experiment, Miller and others have experimented with other atmospheric compositions, too (Chang et al. 1983; Miller 1987; Schlesinger and Miller 1983; Stribling and Miller 1987). Complex organic molecules form under a wide range of prebiotic conditions."

There was a much more recent study that solved some previous problems. I wish I had bookmarked the abstract I read... if I come across it, I'll link it here.

I'll address another quip from Rhology's before I move on: "Whooptie do - intelligently-designed amino acids! This is an advertisement for ID, not for TOE."

The single biggest problem for "intelligent design," I would argue, is its vagueness. Pink elephants floating to our planet bearing the necessary building blocks for life would imply intelligent design as strongly any other story would. A hypothesis that is supported by every potential evidence does not help us narrow down what the real explanation might be.

Occam's Razor:

Here's a more technical readup. Rhology asserted in his comment that "One cause - God - is far simpler than the quadrillions of causes required for naturalistic abiogenesis."

I disagree. Consider two theories of planet movement: Rhology proposes that God moves the planets (after all, what possible force is strong enough to push such huge entities around?). I side with Isaac Newton. Technically, in regards to causes, Rhology has an advantage. What about all the little causes that put the planets in their orbits, determined their weight, shape, velocity, orbital plane, etc? One cause - God - is far simpler, right?

The problem with proposing the supernatural is that it is separate from the natural. In order to propose the existence of a being like God/gods, one must propose an entirely separate plane of reality - one which cannot be tested or observed. Alternatively, one could stick with a (complicated) theory that does not propose new planes of reality. Such a theory would, it turns out, be simpler. We are not faced with motives... "Why does God push the planets around?" A naturalistic theory (like gravity) eliminates all such questions.

I think I covered the important parts of Rhology's Occam's Razor points. He may feel free to ask follow-up questions as he feels inclined.

Trusting science:

There is a difference, I believe, between well-placed trust and blind faith. One has faith in a stranger's motives. I trust my mom and dad. I noted that, in the past, supernatural explanations have always given way to natural explanations. Rhology seems to think this is childlike faith. It strikes me as a solid foundation.

In the past, murder mysteries have had natural explanations. While it is not impossible that this case is supernatural, we are still obligated - if we follow a scientific profession - to exhaust our possible natural answers before we defer to the supernatural.

Furthermore, we must have good reason to believe that a natural explanation will never possibly be found. Otherwise we would be jumping the gun and making a hasty conclusion.

In Rhology's words, my belief that a natural explanation exists for abiogenesis - despite the theory's currently incomplete state - is similar to my "saying that, someday, alchemy will be shown to be valid."

Alchemy has been shown to be not-valid. We currently lack the information to allow us to confirm or dismiss naturalistic abiogenesis theories, though. So, the analogy fails there (too quickly to be a good analogy). Life arising from non-life is not a case of values turning "into their opposites," as Rhology claimed in his comment. Life varies in complexity and is, at times, difficult to define - as with viruses. A connect-the-dots puzzle begins to form if a link is hypothesized from amino acids to RNA to DNA etc. The mechanisms in question to make these transitions require further study.

Back to the nature of science:

Rhology tripped over himself later in his comment, I think. Near the beginning, he agreed with me that science concerns physical laws and theories explaining physical phenomena. Then, he argued that science is not justified in ruling out the supernatural. This apparent reversal might be a misunderstanding on my part, however...

When I say "I will seek a natural explanation for this murder," I have taken a metaphysical stance. I will rule out supernatural explanations. Science, definitively, seeks natural explanations. It is not equipped to study supernatural explanations.

If science DOES study the supernatural - well, Rhology had better alert the greater scientific community. I hope he alerts me first so I do not feel left out.

Rhology went on to write, "Lab science is also unqualified to make judgments on things that happened in the past, but that fact hasn't stopped it from doing so."

Direct your attention, please, to the Talk Origins response to this (apparently typical) claim.

Rhology complained that science "says" it can tackle questions of the supernatural - he seems to want science to cease making claims about the improbability of God. If he can produce any examples of papers or studies that made it past a respected peer review - any such paper or study that makes any attempt to tackle questions of the supernatural - then I will have an answer for him. If he cannot produce such a paper or study, then he already has my answer.

Evolution and mutation:

I wrote, "The emergence of new species is not microevolution, Rho. "

In his comment, Rhology responded with "Yes it is, sorry." I would like to bring to bear a trustworthy source here:

"Microevolution is defined as the change of allele frequencies (that is, genetic variation due to processes such as selection, mutation, genetic drift, or even migration) within a population. Macroevolution is defined as evolutionary change at the species level or higher, that is, the formation of new species, new genera, and so forth. Speciation has also been observed.

The bold emphasis is added. Rhology seeks evidence that "lizards turned into birds." He should note that (to the best of my knowledge) no actual scientist has ever proposed such a transition. A more commonly accepted theory is that dinosaur-like animals evolved into birds.

I pointed out that the process of microevolution is an accumulatory process. No mechanism exists to halt or reverse the changes that occur due to mutations from generation to generation. Until such a mechanism is proposed, we must believe the changes accumulate over time and result in new species. This has been observed.

Over time, a creature as distinct as a dinosaur could become less and less dinosaur-like and more and more bird-like.

Rhology DID propose a mechanism to halt that process of change. As he put it, the change from "lizard" to bird is impossible because of "the fact that they're LIZARDS." He went on to label the theory of microevolutionary processes extrapolated to a longer timeline as a "fairy tale" that anyone could "just dream up."

Oops, I forgot Rhology applied a little intelligent thought to the question of stopping/reversing microevolutionary changes. His primary suggestion was not bad: "That 'beneficial' mutations are highly rare; most mutations screw up organisms."

Not bad at all. However, harmful mutations do not act to halt OR reverse the mutations that do benefit the organism. Imagine, for example, a population of mice isolated in the arctic circle. Mutations occur each generation. Most mutations are neutral; some are harmful. The harmful mutations kill off those with the mutations.

So far we have a population that has not changed.

Finally, one beneficial mutation occurs. In that environment, this mutation is useful (thicker hair, say).

Thicker-haired mice soon become more common and 25 generations down the line, most of the mice have thicker hair. All the while harmful mutations are happening - and killing off the individuals with the harmful mutations - but then another beneficial mutation happens.

And so on. These beneficial mutations accumulate over time. There is no mechanism that has been proposed to stop or reverse these changes; so given enough time, we will start to see "mice" that only vaguely resemble the original population. When these arctic mice cannot naturally breed with their forebears, we have a new species. New species eventually become new families; "lizards" become birds.

Rhology then wrote to question a premise he thinks exists in evolutionary theory: "the premise that more information can be added out of nowhere."

I wish I knew what exactly he was referring to, because this is such a big issue. It is so big that Rhology cited it as one reason he is not an atheist anymore. I have a feeling that in this - as in so many other matters - he is misinformed. Please give me a more concrete example, Rho. Do you mean new genetic functions, new complexity (like amino acids being created from chemicals and lightning) or what?

Young Earth Creationism (briefly):

The thought of this topic makes me want a drink to wash away the bad taste that immediately comes to my mouth. But enough of that - I am not in the mood to argue against the bullshit of Creation "science." I will tell you this: the majority of educated Christians consider it hogwash more fervently than you think the same for the theory of evolution.

I refer to what I just wrote about intelligent design when I claim a hypothesis that accounts for anything (like YEC) is a very poor hypothesis. All evidences can be made to support it, and since none can be falsified, we come no closer to learning what the real explanation is.

Rhology disagrees that this is a weakness, apparently.

He also disagrees that an argument in this form is valid:

1. As we delve deeper into the fossil record, the fossils we find are less and less complex.
2. Therefore, as time progressed further, the animals represented by the fossils went from less to more complex. (Please note - This trend is generally true, although since less-complex and more-complex organisms have always existed at the same time, it is not an absolute truth that less complex fossils preceed more complex ones. Similarly, many species have led long lives. Thus, we find fossils of successful organisms extending deep back into the fossil record).

This is, as Rhology wrote, an unimpressive assumption.

Forensic science and lab science:

Forensic science involves gathering and documenting facts, testing evidences in laboratory settings, and formulating naturalistic theories about what happened in the past. For some elucidation, my post Forensics and Evolutionary Theory may equip you with a more thorough understanding of how these are related.

Theories about evolutionary ancestry and abiogenesis work exactly the same way. Without resorting to *mere* speculation, scientists can gather and document facts, test evidences in laboratory settings, and formulate naturalistic theories about what happened in the past. Forensic science, like evolutionary science and abiogenesis, is indeed repeatable, even if history is not.

Fossils have stories to tell, as I would have Rhology believe. His stance in the comment I'm responding to suggests he thinks of fossils as mere dusty bones. However, fossils have growth rings. We can know how old the individual was. We can know if a dinosaur got in a fight and broke or fractured a bone. We can learn how it healed - or didn't - we can learn how long a body was exposed before being buried (by the marks scavengers left behind), we can learn about its environment (based on how it was buried), we can learn about where it lived (based on whereabouts we find it). We can know how long its kind lived (based on which parts of the fossil record the bones occur in).

Whatever the weaknesses of cladistics may be - we can tell how closely a fossil is related to other ancient species (or living ones) based on similarities. These are the same similarities and differences we use to classify animals today. These things are screamingly obvious to anybody who was once a boy with paleontology aspirations - but apparently not to Rho. If there is anything unclear about why fossil bones are not blank and unresponsive; but rather filled with useful information, tell me.

Closing comment:

I must admit I am a little confused by Rhology's final words to me in his comment: He said he felt overwhelmed "Only by your faith. I'll say this - you make me a little embarrassed that I don't believe as fervently in my religion as you do in yours!"

Often, Rhology and I differ in our definitions. At references to my personal "faith" and/or "religion," my response leans toward a burst of laughter. Still, I should let him clarify. Religion is, to me (and to dictionary.com) "a specific fundamental set of beliefs and practices generally agreed upon by a number of persons or sects... usually involving devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral code governing the conduct of human affairs."

I cling to no such thing. I look forward to Rhology's response.

Addressing some questions from last summer

2007-12-30T23:53:00.000-08:00

It's time to clarify a few things. Last August, Rhology and Calvin had a few questions in response to my post "why be nice?"

Re: Rhology,

Rhology asked this: What reasons do we have to encourage a desire utilitarian outlook on morality?

My answer was "none." He asked why I even wrote the post, then. The thing is, someone does not need to believe desire utilitarianism describes morality, or have anything resembling a "desire utilitarian outlook" on things to be a good person (in desire utilitarian terms). Presumably most Christians look at things the same way - as long as you value brotherly love, kindness, charity etc, you're being a pretty decent person. Having different reasons for action don't give the actions themselves a different merit.

Rhology then wanted to know why we *should* encourage others to have desires that fulfill other desires. The answer is simple. We all have real-world reasons to do so. If I'm surrounded by people who have desire-fulfilling desires (these would include compassion, respect for human rights, love, some degree of patience etc), I am certainly living in an environment that is beneficial for me. I have many, many real-world reasons to bring about this sort of environment. It is better for me and for my family.

Rhology then had a big series of questions: "How do you define "bad" desires? How do you define the wellbeing of others? What does condemnation mean and what are the consequences? What *should* the consequences be? Why should they be so?"

These were in response to my discussion of an evil person (acting on a set of bad desires) who exhibits a strong disregard for the wellbeing of others.

Bad desires are those that tend to thwart the desires of others. Desires, like other objective entities, can be evaluated on their tendency to fulfill other desires. When we see which desires tend to fulfill or thwart the desires of others, we begin to learn which desires are good for people generally. Wellbeing is part of a continuum of fulfilled vs thwarted desires. Someone with a marked disrespect for the wellbeing of others would not hesitate to harm them (act in ways that thwart others' desires).

Condemnation involves verbal or physical action toward others. Were we alive at the time, we could express our condemnation of Hitler's actions by our public outcry and by international action - whether restricting trade or whatever - in order to adjust his desires. Condemnation and praise are tools we can use to discourage or encourage desires.

Re: Calvin,

Calvin asked, "So you’re basically agreeing that DU doesn’t account for no-strings-attached altruism? That’s what I want to know most of all: does DU hold that somebody is objectively right or wrong to do or not do any given action, irrespective of the material effects to him personally?"

I'm not quite sure what the first question is asking. Desire utilitarianism does hold that somebody is objectively right or wrong to do or not do any given action, irrespective of the material effects to him or her personally.

HOWEVER - desire utilitarianism does not hold that certain actions are always right/wrong. Right action is that which a person with good desires would do in that situation. In extreme circumstances, this could include killing, lying, etc. The objective part is desires. Desires are universally good or bad; what action an agent takes is good or bad by merit of which desire/s drove the action.

Calvin said, "the question remains: 'Fine, then I’m evil. If it works for me, why not be evil?' (keep in mind my example accounts for his being able to avoid great hardships and his being comfortable w/ lesser inconvenience)."

We run into this problem all the time. Unfortunately, everybody knows what happens when you try to reason a person out of this stance. Whether you're saying "God doesn't like what you're doing" or "you're causing real harm to others," you begin to realize that rationalizing won't give somebody a reason not to be evil. However, social condemnation (see above) DOES give an evil person reasons to stop being evil. Threatening Hitler with armed resistance if he takes action can beging to curb his evil actions.

Calvin: "No, DU certainly does not stand in stark opposition to moral relativism. I’ve yet to see a single reason why, in a secular existence, DU shouldn’t be regarded as simply one of several competing views."

Moral relativism, typically, is the view that "it's good if it's good for me." Desire utilitarianism strongly differs from this, because the theory claims that good and evil exist independent of individual preference. People who accept DU do not need to get others to adopt that understanding, of course - they simply have the same reasons for action to encourage good desires and discourage evil desires that everybody else has. Often, people who think "it's good if it's good for me" can justify operating on desires that are bad for others. Where this happens, those who accept the premises of desire utilitarianism - along with everybody else - have reasons to condemn those actions.

As any scientifically structured theory, desire utilitarianism should be regarded as one of several competing views! However, that does not rob it of its truth value.

Calvin: "Absent an absolute moral authority independent of fallible humans, the only meaning “wrong” can have (pertaining to conduct) would be “in opposition to X,” and “falling short of X’s standards,” which are only persuasive to those who have already accepted X."

I disagree. Wrong behavior is that which a bad person would do - a bad person being someone who operates on bad desires.

Calvin: "You still have the fact that certain conduct will always be counterproductive or dangerous to one’s own desires, and the ability to persuade as many people as possible of that fact. If that’s enough for you, go for it. I hope it bears fruit. But just be aware that one’s senses of self-interest (persuading them to practice “benign manipulation,” if you will) is not the same as morality."

People can easily confuse "desires" with "self-interest." This is not necessarily the case. I may have a desire to sacrifice all of my personal belongings and wealth for the benefit of others. In that case, my desires have little to do with self-interest. Sometimes our "interest" is in the wellbeing of our family and friends.

Regardless, there are bad desires (disregard for human rights, desires to take what belongs to others by force, desires to harm others generally) that we all have reasons to discourage in society. This is true whether you want to call it morality or not. However, as most competent English speakers consider morality to be a code of right and wrong behavior, desire utilitarianism is what you come to if you're looking for such a code based on objective reasons for action.

Premises of Desire Utilitarianism

2007-12-30T22:25:00.000-08:00

...and some conclusions.

Intro

This is a long-needed post. This is a list of propositions. These are all descriptive "is" statements describing an objective reality. Desire utilitarianism basically proposes that from these "is" statements, we as humans can reach prescriptive conclusions about what humans "ought" to do.

As I haven't spent much time thinking or planning this post, I will leave it open to my future edits, which I'll point out to readers.

Desire utilitarianism is a theory of ethics in a godless universe.

1. Desires are the only reasons for action in humans.
A desire describes a mental state as regards a state of affairs. The classic example is a desire that "I am eating chocolate cake" means that to the agent, the state of affairs where "I am eating chocolate cake" is to be made or kept true. Similarly, a desire that "I am not on fire" means that the state of affairs where "I am on fire" is to be made or kept false.

Desires are real-world, objective entities existing in the firings of neurons in the brain.

2. BDI theory is true regarding human motivation.
Beliefs + Desires = Intentional action. A belief, as used here, is an attitude about a proposition. An agent who believes that water will quench his thirst has the attitude that water will quench his thirst.

This theory of intentional action says an agent will always act motivated by its desires, given its beliefs. An agent that desires that "I am thirsty" is false, acts on the desire as its belief dictates. If the agent believes the glass of water on the counter will quench its thirst, it will drink (intentional action) the water. Unless, of course, there are other desires...

3. An agent will always act so as to fulfill the more and the stronger of its desires.
Where a state of affairs that an agent desires to be true is made or kept true, that desire is fulfilled. Where that state of affairs is made or kept false, that desire is thwarted.

Often an agent will have a false belief. In the case of drinking the water, if the substance in the glass is, in fact, poison, the agent's desire will be thwarted by drinking.

4. Values lie in desires.
Agents place value on states of affairs. No other value exists.

5. Desires can be evaluated.
Objects can be evaluated on the criteria of their tendency to fulfill or to thwart relevant desires. An example is a knife - a good knife fulfills an agents' desire to cut something. The value of "good" is applied on the basis of its tendency to fulfill desires.

Desires being objective entities, they can also be evaluated. Desires can be evaluated on their tendency to fulfill or to thwart other desires. A good example is the desire to seek truth. For an agent that possesses this desire, it has a tendency to fulfill other desires.

6. Desires can be evaluated on their tendency to fulfill or to thwart the desires of other humans.
If I have, for example, a desire to obtain my neighbors' property by whatever means necessary, this desire has a tendency to thwart the desires of my neighbors.

We can call such a desire "bad," just like we can call a desire to support and help my neighbors "good." The desires are good/bad insofar as they have a tendency to fulfill or to thwart the desires of others.

When a desire is thwarted, it is called - to a greater or lesser degree - "harm."

7. When we ask the question "Which desires are good for humans generally?" we arrive at objective conclusions.
Desire utilitarianism does not claim to provide a list of the good desires humans can have. However, it can demonstrably be shown that such desires as honesty, kindness and compassion for others are desires that are good for my neighbors - for all people.

Desire utilitarianism promotes a scientific approach to studying ethics, a strong criticism of beliefs, and the admittance that at least some of its claims could be proven false.

8. There are real-world reasons for action to promote good desires and condemn bad or evil desires.
Given my desires and values, I have many good reasons to want a neighbor who respects my life, my liberty, my property. Similarly, my neighbors have many good reasons for me to have the same respect.

The more we work to create a society full of people who value the life, liberty and property of others, the more we create a society that is safe for our children, friends and family.

8.5 There is a difference between "I desire that the desires of others be fulfilled" and "I desire to fulfill the desires of others.
It is a simple mistake to think that desire utilitarianism demands that we try to fulfill the desires of other people to be good. This is not true. I can easily desire that shopping be done without desiring that I do the shopping.

9. Desires are malleable.
An agent will always act to fulfill the more and the stronger of its desires, given its beliefs (3). Human agents have the means of adjusting those desires. If, for example, I have a neighbor who wants to take my property regardless of how he accomplishes the goal - I can band together with my other neighbors and impose social sanctions on the fellow. If we sever trade with him, punish him fiscally, or temporarily imprison him, he will now have more desires to take into account. For example, his desire for personal freedom may now outweigh his desire to take his neighbors' property.

Criticism/social condemnation is another way to change desires in others.

Children have more malleable desires, so it's important that they be brought up in such a way that they have good desires - preferably that these desires are for end-goals rather than means to ends. For example, I want my neighbor to respect others' property out of a like for respecting others' property... not just as a way to stay out of jail.

10. Agents cannot be reasoned out of desires.
Jedi mind tricks aren't real. We can use reason to say "these aren't the droids you're looking for," but not to say "you don't want to find those droids you're looking for," for you Star Wars buffs.

That's why desires must be, in a sense, outweighed by other desires if we're to change what an agent desires.

11. There do exist cases of negligence.
Occasionally we may run into a case where someone should have been aware of a danger, or have taken more caution into account before acting. We can conclude, in many cases, that a person who doesn't take the time of day to secure a load on his pickup truck, for example, doesn't care enough about those he might endanger.

This sort of person deserves criticism because it is better for all of us if we live in a society full of people who take a great deal of caution where their actions could harm others.

12. A person with good desires and true beliefs performs good actions.
Given that value exists in desire fulfillment (4), the action that a good person (a person with good desires) performs is a good desire in that situation.

This is where desire utilitarianism becomes a situational, rather than a universal, theory. Honesty is a virtue (a good desire), but in a situation where you are sheltering a Jewish family from the Nazis and they ask if you're harboring fugitives, a good person would lie to protect the family.

Other moral questions become meaningless. The classic trolley car example helps demonstrate this. You are on a runaway trolley car and ahead of you the rail splits in two directions. If you maintain your course, you will kill a child on the track. If you switch tracks, you will run over 10 people. When asked what a good person would do in this situation, it becomes obvious that the "dilemma" is meaningless. A good person could choose either action. Neither effects how that person will be as my neighbor.

A note on meta-ethics

Morality is, necessarily, prescriptive. It describes what we should do - what we have reasons for action to do. Much religious morality involves reasons for action that do not exist. If we relate a moral "ought" to real-world reasons for action, we arrive (I am convinced) at desire utilitarianism.

Our reasons for action involve promoting or inhibiting (or permitting) desires - rather than actions - because it is demonstrably the case that desires cause actions and focusing attention on desires is more effective.

A common criticism is that desire utilitarianism is not about ethics. People say that ethics is about doing "God's will," for instance.

However, desire utilitarianism is about prescriptions for action (good and bad), in the hopes of realizing a better world. In this case, a "better world" for all of us is inhabited by people with good desires. Someone arguing against this is challenging many "is" statements listed above.

Please also note that there is no "is/ought" gap here. It is the case that we have these desires. It is the case that we have these reasons for action. What we ought to do is a part of what is true of our reality.

After all of that...

I hold these beliefs as my theory on value and the nature of good and evil. It is very legitimate to challenge the theory of desire utilitarianism (and for more check out www.atheistethicist.blogspot.com and read what Alonzo Fyfe blogs about).

It is also legitimate to challenge how my statements and arguments about morality are (or aren't) related to desire utilitarianism. Whatever you do, however, do not equate desire utilitarianism with atheism. Atheism is a belief about the existence of God, making no moral claims.

**Note: "Doesn't make moral claims" does NOT = "Is immoral," as some have surmised. The pen on my desk, for instance, is not moral. Nor is it immoral.

Christmas

2007-12-28T16:05:00.000-08:00

Last year I wrote a blog post on Christmas full of news headlines. The most prominent included suicide bombings, reports that violence has become even more widespread in certain areas...

This was to point out that on the holiest of Christian holidays, horrific atrocities occurred worldwide - just like any other day. Reading the newspaper headlines for this Christmas, though, made me too upset to even want to point out that the God Christians believe in is, presumably, watching it all with the satisfaction that everything is going to plan, and all the pain and suffering has some worthwhile goal in the end...

What that goal could be has never been answered to me.

Some numbers regarding international aid

2007-12-19T00:22:00.000-08:00

Rod over at Makarios really lost all shreds of my respect. Of course, most rationally minded people would probably call me silly for getting so upset at somebody clearly so stone-dumb closed-minded, but a recent post declared that international aid comes from traditionally Christian countries because "Christians on the other hand act out of compassion... We help because we recognise in others a specialness, a treasure, a gift to the world that should not be discarded or ignored."

My response follows:

This is just over the top, Rod.

Now look - I doubt anything will cure your bigotry. You clearly want to hate a group of people, and no rationalizing or presentation of statistics will alter that desire.

However, I should point out the following:

In 2006, the top 20 countries donating to international aid - by percentage of income - were these:

1. Sweden
2. Luxembourg
3. Norway
4. The Netherlands
5. Denmark
6. Ireland
7. England
8. Belgium
9. Austria
10. France
11. Switzerland
12. Finland
13. Germany
14. Spain
15. Canada
16. Australia
17. New Zealand
18. Japan
19. Portugal
20. Italy

I found this list at www.care2.com, but you can also check OECD, www.poverty.com [http://www.poverty.com/
internationalaid.html] where you'll find out that Sweden donates 103 cents/ every $100 earned, Canada donates 30 cents/ every $100 earned and the United States donates 17 cents/ every $100 earned.

This is in response to a United Nations call for governments to donate 0.7% of their income to international aid. The countries that have met that schedule are Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark. The US and Canada are nowhere near the mark.

Neither is Japan (a predominantly atheistic country), but consider this UNICEF article:

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry
/index_24817.html

"The government of Japan has allocated seventy million dollars to UNICEF to assist in the tsunami relief effort."

NEVERMIND that you're wrong in your premises. The United States is not a historically Christian nation (except that the majority of inhabitants have been Christian). I don't know about Canada, but either way they haven't contributed much to international aid.

AND helping strangers or even potential enemies seems to make worlds of sense to many people in traditionally non-theistic countries.

And when it comes to treasure... from UNICEF's mission statement:

"UNICEF was created with this purpose in mind – to work with others to overcome the obstacles that poverty, violence, disease and discrimination place in a child’s path. We believe that we can, together, advance the cause of humanity.

We advocate for measures to give children the best start in life, because proper care at the youngest age forms the strongest foundation for a person’s future.

We act so that all children are immunized against common childhood diseases, and are well nourished, because it is wrong for a child to suffer or die from a preventable illness."

From www.secularhumanism.org:

"As secular humanists we believe in the central importance of the value of human happiness here and now. We are opposed to absolutist morality, yet we maintain that objective standards emerge, and ethical values and principles may be discovered, in the course of ethical deliberation. Secular humanist ethics maintains that it is possible for human beings to lead meaningful and wholesome lives for themselves and in service to their fellow human beings without the need of religious commandments or the benefit of clergy."

Of course you'll rationalize your way out of this, Rod! I'm not expecting to change your mind. You're filled with bigotry against people who haven't come to the conclusions you've come to because hey - you've considered the other options and they're all wrong!

It may be an empty phrase, but maybe you'll catch my general sentiment toward you at this point: Go to hell, Rod.

Free Rice

2007-12-18T23:29:00.000-08:00

Just to get the word out there - everybody should go to www.freerice.com to play a simple and remarkably addicting word game. For every word you correctly match with its meaning, 20 grains of rice are donated through the United Nations to help end world hunger, as the site puts it.

My stats so far (in case others want to compete):

Top level: 42

The total was 2560 grains of rice donated. If this isn't an awesome cause, I don't know what is.

FWD: Godless Short Stories

2007-12-18T01:21:00.000-08:00

Alonzo Fyfe at Atheist Ethicist suggested the idea of a short story writing contest in which prizes go to winners who write short stories "that boldly assert that there is no God."

I think this is a good idea. Furthermore, I have some resources at my disposal, including the ability to produce a professional layout/design for the final book. If this project gets on its feet, I'd be glad to support it in any way I can.

Mr. Fyfe's post:

Godless Short Stories

Yesterday’s posting has caused me to think of a project that might be worth while. And, if some organization were to take up this project, I would be pleased to make a cash contribution towards its success.

The project is a short-story contest, with prizes to the winner. The contest is for short stories that boldly assert that there is no God and that counters some of the lies and sophistry that denigrate atheists in pop culture. The stories are aimed for young children and, in fact, there should be several contests for several age groups. The winning stories will be bundled together and offered as a book – self-published if necessary.

Of course the religious right will protest about a “stealth campaign” to sell atheism to children. They would be wrong. I am talking about a campaign that is not the least bit stealthy. I am talking about a campaign that virtually shouts that it is just as permissible to create literature that presents atheism in a way that children can understand as it is to create a child’s bible or other religious literature that targets children.

Let them scream. Screaming will just mean more advertizing.

This should be taken up by an organization that is set up to receive donations, because one of the things that I will then do is write a few posts explaining the need for people to make contributions to this project. It will require cash contributions to be offered as prizes, and it will require a great deal of labor to read and judge the stories. Plus, some contributions should go to the organization itself for being an organization that would run a contest like this.

Like I said, I will be more than willing to volunteer time and money to such a project. Really, what I would like is a reputable organization set up to receive and disburse money to handle the bank account.

The T.O.E. and the Big Bang

2007-12-18T00:43:00.000-08:00

Creationist misunderstanding of evolution

This is a transferral of my conversation with Anonymous over at www.atheistethicist.blogspot.com, since I've clogged up enough of Mr. Fyfe's comment thread space already.

Anon's last comment:

The theory of evolution includes the big bang it is not just from when life began. If it includes the big bang then it includes cosmic evolution. If your idea of the theory of evolution starts when life has appeared on the earth then why do you have a problem with creation.

Creationist rhetoricians, I think, like to group theories like evolution with others like abiogenesis and the big bang to make a "stronger" case of - "Oh look at how insurmountable the odds must have been for x, y and z!!!."

UC Berkeley has a helpful introductory site to the theory.

There, it defines evolution thus:

Biological evolution, simply put, is descent with modification. This definition encompasses small-scale evolution (changes in gene frequency in a population from one generation to the next) and large-scale evolution (the descent of different species from a common ancestor over many generations). Evolution helps us to understand the history of life. *

The theory of evolution does not demand or imply the Big Bang theory, nor does it demand or imply that abiogenesis occurred. Notably, among educated scientists, approximately 0.14% (an extremely small number) do not believe the theory of evolution describes reality.** Yet polls suggest - from what I've heard - that at least 50% of scientists call themselves Christian or theistic. I may be wrong here...

However it is certainly not the case that a belief in evolution is inconsistent with a belief in a God.

To answer the second part of your question:

I'm an atheist. Basically every reason I have for being such doubles as "a problem I have with creation."

* http://evolution.berkeley.edu/evolibrary/article/0_0_0/evo_02
**http://www.religioustolerance.org/ev_publi.htm

A simple argument against the "one true religion" idea

2007-12-12T14:25:00.001-08:00

It is relevant to my "disagreement and religious belief" topic. Certainly this argument has been expressed by others, but here is what I see:

The premises:

1. There exists a just God (explanation of "just" to be discussed later)
2. All humans are created equal.
3. There is "one true religion" leading to salvation.

I argue that these three statements cannot all be true at the same time, in light of the fact that there is no equal proportion of followers to non-followers of any religion in the world. Evidence strongly supports the idea that members of any given culture have a strong likelihood of following the religion of their dominant culture.

The first premise:

Justice here refers to the principle that similar cases are to be dealt with similarly. A just judge would not look at two similar cases and give one preferential treatment over another - he would deliver a similar verdict in both cases.

If that is the case, then given a population of humans (all things being equal), each member of that population would be given similar treatment in a trial on the same charge/s.

The second premise:

"All humans are created equal" is an essential premise to the idea of a just God. If there is a way to argue that a just God could create two people and have one "better" or "more valuable" than another, I have yet to hear the argument.

The third premise:

Many - if not most - religious people expressly believe that there is just one "correct" religion, and that those who do not follow it are not favored by God.

Observations:

Assume (1) and (2) are true. If there exists a just God and a population of humans created equal, then we would expect to see a similar ratio of "saved" people worldwide. Since we do not see such a ratio in any religion, we must conclude that there is no "one true religion." (3) is false.

Assume (1) and (3) are true. If there is a just God and there is one true religion, we would expect to see a similar ration of "saved" people to unsaved people worldwide. Since we do not see such a ratio in any religion, we must conclude that some people are privileged over others (either in knowledge or in internal qualities). (2) is therefore false.

Assume (2) and (3) are true. Well, that assumption cannot be made. If all humans are created equal and have an equal chance at salvation, and there is one true religion leading to salvation then we will observe a similar followers to non-followers of that religion worldwide. We do not observe this.

There is no possible situation, given the reality of what we observe, where premises (1), (2) and (3) are all true. Note that this does not suggest ~(1). It is possible for a just God to exist in this argument; that is not compatible with (3), the existence of "one true religion." The argument also does not suggest ~(3), but that if (3) and (2), then ~(1).

Disagreement and Religious Belief, part 1

2007-12-09T13:39:00.000-08:00

Two philosophy candidates visited my university during the last few weeks, and I'd like to write posts to cover their lectures. I'll start with the one I liked least, King's lecture on competing views on "the truth and rationality of religious beliefs."

Religious Diversity and its Challenges to Religious Belief

King began with definitions, which need to be noted.

Exclusivism: One's own religion is privileged over other religions in its truth claims or its capacity to bring people to salvation, or both.
Pluralism: All religions are on par with respect to their truth claims or their capacity to bring people to salvation, or both.
Inclusivism: A middle ground between exclusivism and pluralism.
Skepticism: In cases where people become fully aware of religious diversity, their beliefs cease to be rational. In many cases, rationality requires that religous persons give up their beliefs about the supernatural - withholding belief is the only rational response to religious diversity. *
Naturalism: There exist no supernatural beings.

Salvation vs Doctrine

It should be further noted that King distinguishes between these "isms" and their soteriological doctrinal significance.

A primarily soteriological view suggests knowing the truth about religious doctrines is valuable as a means to salvation.

A primarily doctrinal view suggests that one's view about salvation is influenced by one's view about the status of doctrine (for example, one may not believe that Jesus is the way to salvation unless one believes that Christian doctrine is true).

Competing Views

"I will defend doctrinal exclusivism against its rivals, doctrinal pluralism and skepticism"

King's criticism of religious pluralism was based on an understanding of John Hick, but since I have neither read Hick nor care about either argument, I'll move on.

I must now discuss the * I inserted above. King's definition of skepticism is what I would refer to as "agnosticism." In King's sense of the word, however, a skeptic's view - that the reality of religious disagreement allows us to throw up our hands and say "who knows?" - is justified when a Christian and a follower of another religious tradition butt heads with a "God exists vs God doesn't exist" disagreement.

King's final response to such skepticism is to say that Christians can demonstrate that their belief in God is rational in the face of disagreement simply by holding onto their belief in the face of disagreement.

My Perspective

First things first, it is not a rational argument to say - independent of further explanation - that "no God exists." Especially in the deistic sense, any argument in favor of a universal negative is unsound. So, the Christian and the other religious person are arguing "God exists vs It is unlikely that God exists/no God exists who interacts with the world."

At any rate, an agnostic response is not the best. When faced with two truth-claims from two religions, it is safe to place the burden of proof upon them to demonstrate whose truth-claims are more rational and evidenced by reality. This is, in a sense, a skeptic's view... but more importantly, it is atheism. The atheist view toward various mythologies is the same as his view toward various mythical animals - why believe things like dragons or unicorns exist until sufficient evidence is provided?

It is not rational to say "We may disagree, but since I'm still convinced I'm right about God, my belief is justified," which is what King advocates for the Christian in his lecture. Stay tuned for something just a little bit better and more interesting.

Sapient on locking Christians away

2007-12-04T10:56:00.000-08:00

"What do you think..."

Rhology asked for my take on a Brian Sapient statement. I don't know the original context, but here is the question as Rhology put it in a comment.

What do you think of the Rational Response Squad's Brian Sapient's statement that Christians are mentally ill and should be locked up in mental institutions?

This is a question that requires a multi-part response.

Christians and mental illness:

While there is a clear social factor involved, it has not to my knowledge been demonstrated that Christian beliefs amount to an "impairment of an individual's normal cognitive, emotional, or behavioral functioning"

It may be the case that some Christians have a sort of mental illness. However, Sapient's statement seems to be far too sweeping to have any weight to it, particularly since many Christians are as different from one another as night from day.

This part of the question, then, is a matter of fact. Is it in fact the case that those following the Christian faith (in all of its many forms) are mentally impaired from normal functioning?

No. Human beings do not by default behave rationally, nor to they typically have rational reasons for adopting any given belief.

Should they be incarcerated:

I'll start by stating that we as humans should be given the strong presumption of freedom. It is when human action causes or threatens immanent harm on others that we consider punishment or "locking away."

So the real question is whether we have reasons to keep Christians separated from the rest of society.

Harm:

The answer depends on how "harm" is understood. In a desire utilitarian sense - as expressed in the first post on this blog - "harm" occurs when real-world human desires are thwarted. Because desires are the only reasons for action that exist, humans have reasons to promote good desires in others... good desires being those that tend to fulfill the desires of others.

One example of a good desire is "that the desires of others be fulfilled." *Not necessarily that "I fulfill the desires of others,"* so recognize the difference.

Are Christians more evil?:

We have no good reasons to believe that Christians (especially "all Christians") cause harm to other people, any more than any other group. Not all Christians cause a "mental illness" in others. There is no case that can be fairly made to say that Christians deserve to be jailed any more than any other group, and to make that claim amounts to bigotry.

The strong presumption of liberty we follow (since the removal of liberty is among the most desire-thwarting actions possible) stands until Sapient or others can provide reasons to believe Christians (especially "all Christians") cause or threaten more harm than other groups.

CNN Messes Up

2007-11-20T00:12:00.000-08:00

I think it was intentional
I found a link to a CNN article called Religious Scholars Mull Flying Spaghetti Monster

While I read through the article with some interest, and intend to watch the Nova program it provided a link to, I was a little disturbed by the last paragraph.

He recognized the point when his neighbor, a militant atheist who sports a pro-Darwin bumper sticker on her car, tried recently to start her car on a dying battery.

Militant
Alright, CNN's editors, if not the writer, should have caught this. Look up "militant" in a dictionary. The word refers to people who are "vigorously active and aggressive; engaged in warfare; fighting."

Sporting a pro-Darwin bumper sticker does not make someone militant.

Ultimate words
Militant is a "devil word" in our culture. If you haven't read my previous posts about rhetoric, a devil word is a type of "ultimate word," according to rhetorical theorist Richard Weaver. Ultimate words hold a specific meaning in the mind of the audience.

"God words" are words like liberty, justice, bravery etc., while devil words involve ideas like terrorism, threat, violent, cowardly etc. When readers perceive the word "militant" in a description of an atheist, their first subconscious idea is one of fear and threat with regards to the subject.

This is not a simple type error - this is an unethical choice of words.

Advanced

2007-11-18T02:14:00.000-08:00

There are a lot of misconceptions about the idea of being "advanced."

For one thing, "advanced" is a word. It describes a phenomenon or an idea - in this case, the idea of progression. In our eyes, we as humans in this day and age are "advanced." Our advanced technology, our advanced cruise missiles and stealth fighters; our advanced economy and philanthropy etc...

Truth is, using a term like "advanced" implies a goal. Advanced cancer is cancer that has progressed toward the goal of death. An advanced society is progressing toward... what?

The theory of evolution does not propose any goal for human beings or any other creatures. Only those that fit the environment best will survive. When we use the term "advanced," we honestly don't know what genetic traits will advance the species. We shouldn't care, either, because trying to control how the species advances is eugenics. Bad idea.

This post is to discuss the idea of the concept "advanced." I think it's completely subjective and changes with time. The internal combustion engine was a great advance, and it led to the creation of the most advanced vehicles in the most advanced time period ever. Nowadays it is not "advanced."

All of this to say - don't use the term lightly. An "advancement" of technology or society may not be a real advancement. It might just be portrayed that way by the people trying to sell their ideas.

Anthony Flew - It doesn't really matter

2007-11-08T12:10:00.000-08:00

Introduction

Appeals to authority are valid arguments only insofar as the authority is an actual authority, and if the truth matches what the authority says.

-On any given philosophical issue, citing Richard Dawkins as an authority is a fallacy. He may, by coincidence, be correct about the issue, but that is not by merit of his "authority" stance - because he is not an authority on philosophy.

-Citing Sam Harris as an authority on a philosophical issue is a much better idea, as he is trained in philosophy. However, he may be incorrect or dishonest in what he says.

In both these cases, what the person says may be taken as a valid argumentative position - only insofar as the position that authority takes is correct.

Anthony Flew

For a few years now, this former atheist-turned-deist has been paraded by religious folks and degraded by freethinkers. This New York Times article has generated conversation all over the bloggosphere. I'm here to say it doesn't matter.

Flew's conversion from disbelief to belief in a higher power is interesting only if he demonstrates that the arguments which swayed him are valid and should logically sway rational thinkers. As he has simply churned out age-old arguments made invalid since Occam's Razor was formalized (at least), Flew's conversion holds no significance whatsoever.

Disassociation

There has always been an unfair bias among religious people and atheists on this sort of issue. Anthony Flew was undeniably an atheist, and he is now undoubtedly a theist. When a Christian becomes a "poor example" of Christianity (ie. gets involved in scandalizing male prostitution ordeals), he/she is easily shrugged off as "never even was a Christian."

This is how religious people can avoid criticism. Of course, they're quick to jump back to "of course we all fail - but if [someone other than me] fail on a grand scale, it shows she was never a Christian to begin with." This is the "no true scotsman" fallacy. I bring it up in part because, ironically enough, Anthony Flew is credited with having coined the name for that particular logical fallacy.

The point is this: Just as the actions of a theist in no way discredit the argument that "at least one god exists," the decision of an atheist to become a theist in no way weakens atheist arguments. If the motivations for Flew's decision are valid, we have a different story - similarly, if the motives of the misbehaving theist derive from his religious views, we may call into question any cultural acceptance of the particular religious teaching he was following.

Quit focusing on Flew; continue to discuss the arguments that led to his conversion.

Awkward

2007-11-06T17:37:00.001-08:00

As a journalist, I occasionally cover stories about Christian events. In fact, every week I cover a worship service for the university paper. Today, I sat in attendance beside a faculty member from the school.

This particular service was about grief - the general theme being "there are different seasons in life; sometimes we are joyful, sometimes we are sad." I enjoyed singing the songs, but when we were asked to join in prayer with the person next to us, I felt a little uncomfortable. She asked me if I had anything I'd like to pray about. I told her "I'm not really the praying type," but encouraged her to pray.

She asked for God to help me with my senior year and the years beyond that, before asking for a stronger community where the people who feel alienated (in this case, non-white/non-Christian people) did not feel so excluded.

I could agree with all of that, but then again I felt a little bit excluded as well. I was not praying, I was just nodding in agreement. What sort of reaction would have fit? Should I have prayed? Whether or not one is religious, praying is just talking to the air/oneself/those within earshot. To pray, I would have felt like someone indulging a person who has an imaginary friend in the room. Try doing that and not feeling like you're being condescending. It was awkward, but at least I was respectful and honest.

Look What Reared Its Ugly Head

2007-11-02T15:47:00.000-07:00

Just a cursory glance at Makarios' blog site shows that, despite the break he swore to take after a bit of a thrashing he took over the summer, he has been running wild with some irresponsible, bigoted and downright strange claims. I plan to post a few responses to some of the smellier posts on his own site, but this one needs a little special attention.

Richard Dawkins = the next Joseph Stalin

"A quote from a speech by Joseph Stalin when he came to power is 'Religion must be out of Russia within five years.' Gee, where have I heard a sentiment like that before? Oh ya. It’s from the latest atheist saviour Richard Dawkins. Substitute 'North America' for Russia and that is exactly the dream of hate-monger Richard Dawkins and his band of rage-filled, intolerant followers."

"Ultimate Words"

One of my early posts on this blog concerns the use of "ultimate" words in rhetoric. "God" words invoke a good reaction, while "Devil" words invoke a reaction of fear and hate in the audience. Makarios' post contains these terms in describing a group:

Hate-monger, rage-filled, intolerant, mass murder, totalitarian, eliminate, oppression and persecution.

Makarios described "the atheist dream of the mass murder of Christians."

It's disgustingly bigoted, evil rhetoric.

The art of persuasion

I really enjoy the study of rhetoric, and there is such a thing as good and evil rhetoric. This is, quite simply, the evangelistic method used by a self-described (if mockingly) "fundamentalist asshole."

On other blogs, people have wondered if Makarios is just an internet troll trying to get attention. Regardless - others should see that his sort of hateful and unfair speech is not to be tolerated.

If he is right - if Richard Dawkins is assembling an army of atheists to rid the country of the religious - then he and his followers will be deserving of even stronger criticism. However, in the lack of evidence for such claims, Makarios is very much in the wrong for inciting hostilities toward atheists as a whole. Not only do his claims regard non-existent threats; he is criticizing an entire group for what one person (or subset of a group) allegedly said.

Bad form.

Opinions

2007-10-10T11:07:00.001-07:00

Everybody has an opinion.

I was criticized recently for some writing I did. First, as a reporter for the university newspaper, I covered a lecture and wrote an objective story. Second, I expressed my opinion on that lecture topic in an unaffiliated public forum.

I was criticized for doing so.

Apparently, it drags my objective image through the dust. I wonder what the time limit is - can I write about the topic next week? Can I ever discuss the idea for the rest of my life? Does an audience really think a news writer cannot write an objective story if he has an opinion on the topic?

Time will tell, I suppose.

A Hiatus

2007-08-22T00:46:00.000-07:00

My job has been very constraining on my time lately and I have been (to everybody's great disappointment, to be sure) unable to write here.

Hopefully I can get back on it soon; there is plenty to respond to.

Why Be Nice?

2007-08-03T13:32:00.000-07:00

Rhology and Calvin have unwittingly prompted me to write a little bit on this topic. Why should a person be good and why, in particular, should one be 'good' in a desire utilitarian sense?

Rhology listed a few reasons here as to why he acts nice, beside the threat of Hell:
1) I love Jesus b/c He saved me.
2) Jesus lived a morally pure life and commanded me to do the same for a variety of reasons.
3) So I try to.
That's the distillation. Others:
4) Living like Jesus is what God created me to do. I don't want to live against my operational specifications. Don't want to use a hard drive as a baseball bat.
5) It makes the Good News of Jesus that I tell to others more credible.

Rhology wants to act like a Christian (according to Rhology's understanding of how a Christian should act). Others can make a nearly identical list of reasons and use them to explain a set of behavior starkly in contrast with Rhology's own.

Anyway...

Reasons for Action
First of all, it doesn't really make sense to ask whether or not we should encourage people to see morality through the lens of desire utilitarianism. What makes sense, according to Alonzo Fyfe, is to ask whether reasons for action exist for promoting certain desires, and whether they are more and stronger than the reasons against promoting those desires.

But why prescribe the actions and desires that desire utilitarianism suggests we prescribe? Mr. Fyfe has explained that desire utilitarianism is a description of how prescription works.

"As such, desire utilitarianism is to be adopted or rejected on the same types of criteria that any other descriptive theory is to be accepted or rejected. Are the claims that desire utilitarianism make about prescription true or false?
For example:

All prescriptions are recommendations to bring about or avoid a particular state of affairs.

A prescription brings to bear the ‘reasons for action that exist’ that recommend bringing about or avoiding a state of affairs.

Desires are the only reasons for action that exist."

Another proposition I'd like to add is this:
An agent will act to fulfill the more and stronger of its desires, given its beliefs.

That being the case, all we can do to prescribe a particular action is try to convince the person that acting in a particular way will, in fact, fulfill his or her desires. We cannot argue someone out of their desires. Nothing I can say will convince a person who enjoys lying not to enjoy lying. This should be pretty apparent.

What we can do, however, is several things.

Adjusting Malleable Desires
First, we can apply social rewards and sanctions/praise and condemnation to make it the case that certain desires are given precedence. For instance, if somebody desires to be dishonest and manipulative, if we apply enough condemnation and sanction, at some point it will benefit the liar to behave honestly, and he will thus desire to do so.

Perhaps more importantly, though, we can apply these tools to our children from a young age. We can raise them with an aversion to dishonesty. Then, when they approach a circumstance in which it may be personally beneficial to behave dishonestly, their aversion to dishonesty may make it the case that they desire to be honest anyway.

Do reasons for action exist to promote honesty and to cultivate an aversion to dishonesty in others, and do those reasons for action outweigh those that recommend promoting dishonesty and discouraging honesty? Yes they exist, and they certainly outweigh the opposing reasons.

"If it is true that desires are the only reasons for action that exist, then the desires that we have the most reason to promote are those that best fulfill the more and stronger of our desires.

Some desires (the aversion to lying) tend to fulfill other desires, while some desires (the desire to rape young children) tend to thwart other desires."

Ultimately
What reasons do we have to encourage a desire utilitarian outlook on morality? Well, none; it's not an important question.

What reasons do we have to encourage or discourage different desires based on their general tendencies to fulfill or to thwart other desires?

All the reasons in the world. The only reasons for action are desires. Promoting desire-fulfilling desires in others is something which every single person has all the reason in the world to do.

Now, at this point everybody has a particular set of desires. Some are good and some are bad - this goes for me and everybody else. It's next to impossible to adjust those desires now - neither we nor anybody else can reason us out of our desires. However, they can be outweighed by other reasons for action. This is what we provide when we condemn bad actions and praise good behavior.

Q&A
Calvin posted some thoughts here which I'd like to try to (briefly) address. Of course, he wrote a lot, so I'll probably have to follow up on this.

"I can’t find any reason why I should board in the first place."
_I hope I at least began to address this. Nobody can change your desires - only give you other reasons for action that outweigh them.

"I don’t see why I should value the fulfillment of another’s desires"
_No specific desires are intrinsically 'supposed' to be fulfilled. That's not the point. The point is that acting on good desires - not those that fulfill specific desires, but those that tend to fulfill the desires of others - is what we should encourage.

"But is reaping pragmatic future rewards the extent of society's interest in morality? Or is there another component?"
_I'm not sure what the other component would be. All people act so as to fulfill the more and the stronger of their desires - it is in our interest to encourage others to act on particular desires (those that tend to fulfill the desires of others). Pragmatic future rewards are a particular type of 'reasons for action' that exist for us. There's no way to cause people to act in opposition to their desires. We can simply shape those desires.

"Let's say you have someone who just doesn't care about the fulfillment of others' desires... What does morality say to/about such a man?"
_He's evil. He acts on a set of bad desires, and exhibits disregard for the wellbeing of others. He's worthy of condemnation.

"I need to know whether or not human desires matter, and why they matter, to decide whether or not I have any obligations towards them."
_They matter because they're all that matters. All that is important or means anything to mankind is tied up in desires. To respect, empathize, or mean well toward another human being, you must acknowledge and, in most cases, respect his/her desires.

"That truth, that underlying meaning I’m searching for can either be the soul, or it can be firing neurons."
_How to put this... If there is a soul which provides empathy and other good feelings, then we can assume it also provides the more negative entities of hate, bigotry, callousness.

You can argue that those exhibiting the latter set of traits are simply not in their original state. However, it could just as easily be the case that the former set of traits (such things as empathy) are the real aberrations, and the intrinsic state of the soul is hateful and bigoted.

In fact, we find that people's tendencies toward empathy or callousness are profoundly influenced by upbringing. We're born essentially tabula rasa.

"It’s preposterous to think I should care in the slightest about firing neurons that don’t affect me."
_For one thing, you don't have to. Desire utilitarianism never says that you *should* care about others. It simply says that some desires are to be encouraged and others discouraged; this for objective reasons we all have. One of these good desires, it can be argued, is the aversion to thwarting the desires of others (firing neurons) unless there is good reason to do so.

For another, you're using loaded language here. It may be the case that 'firing neurons' is the extent of what our thoughts and feelings are. Calling it a 'soul' does nothing to increase the worth of that phenomenon; calling it firing neurons does nothing to increase that worth.

"DU may not be moral relativism, but it offers no challenge to it."
_On the contrary, it stands in stark opposition to moral relativism.

"If your pure reasoning, truly free of ideology & emotion (and free of the poisonous influence of fanatics like Hitchens & Harris), honestly leads you away from God, so be it."
_Thank you for being so respectful. I have yet to read anything by Dawkins, Hitchens or Harris, so I can't comment on the poisonousness of their influence. Yes, my reasoning leads me to the conclusion that, while I cannot disprove the existence of God, and no evidence points toward or against such a being, it is rather unlikely that it exists.

Yet the conclusion a particular line of reasoning takes me to is that there is, in fact, reason for morality in a godless world.

A Little Further Reading:
Alonzo Fyfe has some essays which may help address the topic:
Why Worry About Morality?
So, you want to be a desire utilitarian
Promoting Desire Utilitarianism
Evaluating Moral Theories
The 1000 Sadists Problem

Justification

2007-08-02T11:11:00.001-07:00

Recently I've been hearing the same line of thinking from a couple of sources - one from Sye, who has been patiently indulging in a little comment war here on my blog, and one from Rhology, who has been patiently indulging in little comment wars on his own blog.

This line of thinking has appeared to me to be circular and invalid, but Sye in particular has brought the point right to me: How do I know I can trust my reasoning and logic?

One answer
These gentlemen have postulated that unless there is a God, we cannot know that our reasoning and logic is trustworthy, because we have no foundation for them. Before I philosophize further, I want to examine that claim. It's a premise:

1. Unless there is a God, we cannot trust our reasoning and logic.

Essentially, it then goes like this:

2. We can trust our reasoning and logic

3. Therefore, God exists.

Yes, it begs the question. If we accept Premise 1, when we are approached with Premise 2 we are free to say 'Uh uh uh, can we? You haven't yet proved that God exists. Until you've reasoned that God exists, I apparently can't trust your ability to reason that God exists...'

The real question at hand
is Premise 2. Can we trust our reasoning and logic? If Premise 1 is true, then we cannot know if Premise 1 is true, and we thus cannot use Premise 1 to lead into Premise 2.

The only way we can know whether or not Premise 1 is true is if Premise 1 is, in fact, false.

That's because it takes reasoning to come to the conclusion of Premise 1. Only if you can trust your reasoning without there being a God can you come to the conclusion that only if a God exists can you trust your reasoning. It's a mess.

Coherentism
The issue here, as the title of the post indicates, is justifying beliefs. Doing this, one often runs into the problem of an infinite regress: I know it's Thursday because yesterday was Wednesday, which I know because the day before was Tuesday, ad infinitum.

Typically, there are three options for attempting to justify beliefs. The first is that there is an infinite regress, as described above, which is incapable of actually justifying anything. The second is foundationalism. Foundationalists believe that this infinite regress is halted when it settles upon a belief that is justified without being justified by other beliefs. The third option is that beliefs are simply justified by other beliefs which are, in turn, justified by others in a circular fashion - and circular reasoning is, of course, incapable of justifying a belief (as I hope Sye and Rhology realize at some point).

Coherentism is usually represented metaphorically as a web of beliefs, which is made strong and self-supporting by the relationship each belief has with the other beliefs, all of which are tied together.

Doubt
I have to thank Sye for bringing up the issue. My core beliefs are brought into question practically every day, and I am quite often made to doubt them - or, at least, to strongly reconsider them - and I have to read up on or think about them with a great deal of concern.

I hadn't previously thought about how I justified my trust in human reasoning and logic. My first reaction was 'well, it corresponds to reality.' Truth is, it's a little something more. If I must use logic and reasoning to justify logic and reasoning, have I not engaged in circular reasoning? If I must start with the reasoned premise that God must exist for reasoning to exist, have I not begged the very question?

Ultimately
I trust my perception of reality. I trust it because it forms a very coherent web. No one belief has to lean on another in a linear fashion - they work together holistically. I am an empiricist through and through, so I believe that what we perceive as real is what is really real. I also trust what reliable people have observed under reliable circumstances. These observations begin to form a web, part of which is that logic and reasoning conform to reality, and that illogic and unreasoning does not. These beliefs and observations are tied to the observations others have made. Overall, it makes a web coherent enough that I am willing to let it support my weight.

When a little fly catapults into my web and destroys a strand or two, I'll just have to rush over and try to repair or replace the strands. I think that's all we can do.

Reminiscence

2007-07-25T21:52:00.000-07:00

One advantage a person has in being a religious person and then becoming an atheist is that I have a very important set of memories. I understand what it feels like to be religious. For a while after rejecting my religious beliefs I was rather defensive and prickly about the matter. I was impatient with people who didn't see things the way I did. I was the one, after all, whose eyes had been opened.

Then I realized that any criticisms I leveled about the basic intelligence of the religious was a criticism I had to apply to myself. That's how I know you religious people are smart and all very handsome and well-mannered :)

It has been nearly a year, at the time that I'm writing this, since I have called myself a Christian. My memories of my faith-based life, thus, are still vivid. I was cleaning out a few possessions and came across an old page-binder in which were some folded-up pieces of paper with poems I had written.

I don't know the limits of copyright law on the internet and such, so if these poems reflected what I considered to be excellent pieces of work, I'd be more anxious in ensuring that I maintain the rights than I am. However, I have no qualms with using them to illustrate my thoughts.

"The winter came sudden, like the Norsemen of old,
With unstoppable force and unbearable cold.
It brought layers of snow that topped off the charts,
And it froze 'til the cars would not even start.

Is it true that the winter is dead?
Is it through?
Will the sun reascend?
Winter's fled, at its end?

The winter then stopped, it was brought to a halt,
But the snow was still thick and the roads needed salt.
The clouds of the storm swept out of the skies
So the comforting sun, unchallenged, could rise.

It is true that the winter is dead!
It has fled!
It is through!
Winter's fair end lets the sun reascend!

The sun reaches its zenith, not a cloud stands to fight,
And the warm, shining rays cast a life-giving light.
See the temperature rise as, to no one's surprise,
The snow starts to melt as the long winter dies.

Yet is it true that the winter's quite through?
Is it thoroughly dead?
In defeat has it fled?
Has it come to an end or will the sun now descend?

For the winter still lurks, it is not far away,
And the gathering clouds dissipate the sun's ray.
Until shadow and cold once again mist our breath
And the sun choked by clouds and by winter's cold death.

But the sun will have victory, though it seems he's not here
The winter months are waning and the spring's drawing near.
What had once been frozen, hopeless and bleak
Can be saved by the sun in less than a week.

Now winter and death have come to an end
And freeing the world, the Sun will ascend
The winter will flee and we'll all become free
The coldness is through, now at last that is true."

I wrote that when I was fifteen or sixteen years old - in my defense, I had only just started writing poetry. Yet the allegorical nature of this poem is blatant even without replacing the word 'sun' with 'Son.' This sort of imagery allowed me to place strong emotional contexts to my faith. I have never liked the winter (except for the opportunities it affords me to go snowboarding... wrapped up warmly). It may not be something that happens to all of the faithful, but I had personal emotional attachments to my religious beliefs, some of which were quite subconscious. Other people may equate their faith with the faith of a loved one, even someone who has died. To criticize that person's faith, then, is subconsciously like criticizing the faith of the loved one.

I think the second poem helps demonstrate the emotional aspects which controlled my outlook on my faith:

"Isn't it great to read a tale of epic struggle against the bad?
When good is threatened; about to fail, but summons strength few knew it had?
When the battle's lost and all have fled and evil's finally won,
A spark of good stands up to fight when all the rest have run.
Good faces evil, a David and Giant, small but grim and still defiant,
And evil sways in fear and doubt of this strange combat that's just begun,
And locked in battle this underdog knows that he can overcome.

It seems it's just in stories that these happy tales occur,
But far beyond our consciousness a spirit battle stirs.
For we have an evil tyrant, and we have a fallen race,
We have a hero who rose again from dying in our place.

The battle still is raging - we'll be drawn to it 'ere long,
So let's just put our armor on so God will make us strong.
And when the battle's lost and all have fled, and evil seems to win,
Our Lord will come, absolve our sins, and save our worthless skin."

There's nothing more honest than my attitude about that story was when I wrote it. With all sincerity, that's how I viewed my faith - in a nutshell. An epic struggle against the bad. A hero who died and rose again. A noble God who takes our side, even when we don't deserve it.

It's impossible to overstate the importance of emotion in our mental persuasions. I urge everybody who reads this to consider how your outlook on life looks to someone who does not share your emotional attachment to it. Does it still look the same?

Proving God

2007-07-21T13:54:00.000-07:00

If there's anything more impossible than living around the turn of the millennium and not having heard of Morgan Freeman, it's proving the existence of God.

Which God?

Atheism can have a few meanings, but in general that meaning depends on to what it's referring. "A" means "without," and "theos" is, of course, "God." Theos is seen so differently around the world, though. Sometimes god is known by a different name, and other times by different characteristics. Many Christians feel that their God is different from Allah because of certain traits - a triune nature, omni-benevolence, the trait of 'heavenly Father-ness.' So when asked if they believe in a god of Allah's characteristics, the proper response is to say 'No, there is no such god. The universe is without (A) such a being (theos).'

Nearly every Christian in America, likewise, does not believe that the God of the Westboro Baptist Church exists. Such a God exhibits the characteristic of hating people - most people, in fact. When asked about their belief in such a god's existence, most Christians' proper response is 'No, there is no such god. I am an atheist in that regard.'

More commonly, atheists describe themselves as people who simply do not believe in any gods because no compelling evidence can be provided in support of such a claim. This is probably best described as a materialist or secularist outlook. The premise that 'all is matter' is sufficient until proof is provided by those on whom the burden rests - those claiming that a 'super-natural' aspect to the universe is real. Along with the burden of proof, such people also strive against the principle of Occam's Razor, which suggests that when given two alternative explanations to a phenomenon or phenomena, the simpler is to be preferred. Clearly, when a natural explanation for the universe is plausible and well-evidenced, it makes no sense to propose the infinitely complicating factor of the supernatural.

All of this to lead to the idea that proving 'God' is very difficult. Einstein's idea of God was something akin to the mystery of the unknown in the universe. Hell, I believe in that God. Disproving that concept of God is impossible. Yet the more specific we get in terms of describing the traits/characteristics of this divine entity, the more realistic it becomes to disprove it.

I believe the universe is just matter. I see no reason to infer the supernatural - except to explain things which we don't have answers for yet. However, an argument from ignorance has never been my idea of a strong stance. When it comes to the Christian God of the Bible, though, I believe such a being can be disproven because of its characteristics: all-powerful, all-knowing; all-good.

www.proofthatgodexists.org

I was directed to this website a few months ago, and I quickly came to the conclusion that it was ridiculous. I had forgotten about it until I had the good fortune of coming across an excellent blog called The Set of All Things Not Identical to Themselves.

I found a blog entry describing the author's experience at the website, and his critique of it. The author of the site then responded. Now I feel compelled to offer my own criticism of the website, as I feel it is misleading.

False Dilemmas

A false dilemma usually takes the form of an 'either-or' statement. "Either you believe in God, or all morality is subjective opinion." Well, that's not true. The typical way of dealing with this sort of argument is to 'go between the horns' and point out counterexamples where it doesn't have to be one or the other.*

Of course, in the case of contradictions, a dilemma is valid. You can't go between the horns of 'Either I am holding a pen or I am not holding a pen.' Logically, either one or the other must be true. It becomes a fallacy when there is an excluded middle... 'Either there are elephants on Mars, or it is raining in Seattle today' happens to be my current favorite example.

Back to the Website

When you enter the site, your first choice is to select whether you believe in absolute truth, don't believe it, don't know, or don't care. The author is not careful at first to point out what he means, but he seems to mean 'X is either true or false for all people at all times,' and that X is the sort of statement that exists in the real world. So far, so good. "It is cold out" is not an absolute sort of truth, but "I am cold" is. So I click that I agree.

"The Bible teaches that the existence of God is so obvious that we are without excuse for denying it."

Alright, let's see just how easy this is.

1. Laws of Logic Exist: True. Regardless of what we call them, our system of describing why 2+2=4 refers to actual phenomena.

2. Laws of Mathematics Exist: True... if redundant.

3. Laws of Science Exist: True. Here, however, it becomes important to consider what 'exist' means. Many a quaint and curious volume of forgotten lore exists about unicorns. From that, we cannot infer that unicorns exist. A law of science does not mandate how the universe operates. A law of science is a human idea that makes predictions and seeks to explain what we can observe about the universe. A law's existence does not necessitate the existence of its subject. For instance, I can reference a law that peasants are to be afforded no mercy when they steal from the royalty - but that doesn't mean that peasants and royalty exist (at this time). It is a valid point, however, to say that the phenomena described by laws of logic, mathematics and science exist, though. In this case, I will go for it.
PS, remember that this same consideration should be taken into account in the previous questions - what people have codified is irrelevant; its congruence with reality is what matters.

4. Absolute Moral Laws Exist: This question has issues on so many levels.

First, there is some equivocation on the word 'law.' Equivocation means the word or phrase can mean two different things as it is used in the argument.** A law of science is an invariable and universal fact about the physical universe. If matter behaves in a way that contradicts such a law, it disproves the law. Likewise, if numbers behave in a way that contradicts or violates mathematical or logical law, then we are wrong about the laws.

Are moral laws the same? Would the author state that a set of principles of right behavior exist in the universe, and all interactions of matter must conform to those laws - and that if matter violates those laws, we must reject and/or rewrite the laws? Well, no. There is no universally agreed-upon set of laws for right and wrong behavior (although we see globally, cross-culturally exhibited aversions to some types of behavior in, perhaps, a majority of cultures).

So the author is using the word 'law' differently in this question. In fact, he seems to be using it more in the sense of government. A law, in this sense, governs how an individual or group is to behave in a community, and is established by some authority. Presumably, given the premise of the website, the author is referring to a law established by the authority of God to rule over the community of humankind.

Second, we're back to the idea of 'existence.' Can we observe this sort of moral law? That is, a code of right and wrong established in communities by forms of authority? Sure! But they're not absolute. The 'moral foundation' of the law for adults not to sexually trifle with 14 year olds in our nation is not something people in other places and cultures are expected to abide by.

On the surface, such a question doesn't usually demand much thought. That's why the questions about laws of logic, math and science were asked first - the reader becomes settled in the rut of thinking that somehow a moral law is the same as these other, more obvious, laws.

So what if you select the right answer? What if you click 'No?'

You're presented with a dilemma:
"Either molesting children for fun is absolutely morally wrong, or it could be right."

The problem here is introducing a motive. Motive plays a huge role in discerning moral culpability. If there's a difference between killing and murder, it lies in the motive of the person taking the life of the other. Essentially what this site is doing, though, is presenting you with a false dilemma. "Either molesting children for fun is potentially good behavior, or there's an absolute moral law." That is not a necessary conclusion to come to. It could be the case that molesting children for fun is terrible behavior to all people, at all times, AND that there is no absolute moral law. In fact, that is the conclusion that I hold at this website (if you read my second post, you may understand why).

So imagine I pose this question to the author:

"Either killing is ALWAYS a morally disgusting thing to do, or NO absolute moral laws exist."

I imagine he'd protest. He'd say, "No, sometimes killing is necessary - even God does it. That doesn't mean that no absolute moral laws exist."

Exactly. Motive is necessary to determine whether an action is right or wrong behavior. Had the question excluded the phrase 'for fun,' the answer would obviously be yes: it could be right to molest a child. If an alien race invades and says 'either you molest this child, or we molest everybody,' then the right thing to do is undoubtedly to molest the child. At the same time, the desire to molest children for fun is evil. These concepts are not contradictory, and thus, though cleverly concealed, the question poses a false dilemma.

Finally, this part of the website is very obviously, and self-admittedly, an appeal to emotion. While an important aspect of persuasion in many cases, and not necessarily a logical fallacy, there are still responsible and irresponsible ways to appeal to emotion.

"I feel that the best test to determine whether or not you really believe that absolute moral laws exist, is not whether you feel that atrocities like rape and child molestation could be right somewhere in the universe, but whether they could ever be right if perpetrated against you or someone you love."

I find this sort of thinking strange coming from someone who feels that morality is not dependent on individual feeling - yet he feels inclined to appeal to individual feeling to make his point. If what he is arguing is true, then an appeal to emotion and subjective feeling would be pointless - unless he were to make a further argument, such as that these absolute laws are ingrained in members of the human community just as societal laws become ingrained in members of a society. Yet, we find that this phenomena is not the case. It's a prediction of the Bible that all people have 'the law' written on their hearts, but this prediction is not substantiated in tests. Testing seems to confirm, as a matter of fact, that value judgments and emotional responses to situations depends largely on factors in people's upbringing.

I'm tempted at this point to simply exit the site. However, I will tell an untruth just to keep moving.

5. Laws of Logic, Mathematics, Science and Absolute Morality are Immaterial: True. In the sense that the website author presents the case, something material is able to be touched, seen, smelled, heard and/or tasted. I should add that most of the spectrum of light does not fall into this category. Atoms, likewise, are not seen so much as the effects they make are observed. Gravity, likewise, is 'immaterial.'

Apparently, it is a futile attempt to "find an abstract entity in nature." Since I can't find the physical number 3, it is immaterial. Ok, I can agree to this (but I thought I should elaborate before continuing).

6. Laws of Logic, Mathematics, Science and Absolute Morality are Universal: True. As far as we know (and this seems to be a safe belief), our understanding of logic, mathematics, and science are universal. Likewise, standards of right and wrong behavior that are universal can be argued (as I maintain in this blog).

7. Laws of Logic, Mathematics, Science and Absolute Morality are Unchanging: True. Our understanding of them (the actual laws, which are a codification) changes, but the phenomena we seek to describe using them does not.

Ooh, the quick jab from the right, the hard hit from the left!

"Universal, immaterial, unchanging laws cannot be accounted for if the universe was random or only material in nature."

This is downright wrong. For one thing, nobody claims that the universe is random. For another thing, nobody claims that the universe is material in the way the author used the term material. This is yet another instance of equivocation. As the website puts it, material = corporeal. However, materialists don't (obviously) disbelieve in things like light, atoms and gravity just because they do not take a physical form. Of course, I'm probably straying far too close to the realm of quantum reality than I'm qualified to tread here, but these very real aspects of reality in no way rule out the claim that all that exists is the natural.

"Only in a universe governed by God can universal, immaterial, unchanging laws exist."

Big question coming up: Why? Nah, let's be like the website author - let's leave that unexplained. We'll just state it and then not support it.

8. The Proof that God Exists: Without Him, you couldn't prove anything.

Yep, it's just stated like that. The bulk of the questions simply reaffirm that there is a uniformity to the universe. Great. What I'd be interested in hearing is how exactly this isn't circular reasoning.

Begging the question, for those unfamiliar with the concept, involves assuming your premise to prove your conclusion. In this case, check it out:

1. If there's no God, nothing can be proved.
2. We just proved something
3. Therefore, God exists.

Funny thing... mustn't the conclusion necessarily be true in order for (2) to be true? The answer is yes. If we assume premise 1, then we cannot state premise 2 until we've established conclusion 3. We're free to believe premise 2 is false until we're convinced of conclusion 3, so we can't use premise 2 to argue that conclusion, because the logic is circular and begs the question in point.

Ultimately

The sort of thinking behind this website is saddening. If the author makes an appearance here to respond, that would certainly be interesting, as I'd like to understand just how far he grasps the 'laws of logic' he referred to, ever so ironically, early in the website experience.

I found that the author has a blog website. I think I'll write him and leave this blog with the prominent quote on proofthatgodexists.org: "Whoever loves discipline loves knowledge, but he who hates correction is stupid." Let's see how the truth of this statement bears out.

*http://www.fallacyfiles.org/eitheror.html
**http://www.fallacyfiles.org/equivoqu.html

A Delicate Issue

2007-07-20T11:36:00.000-07:00

Criticizing the Religious
We live in a time in which people very similar to me criticize organized religion for the evils it causes. I ran into an article that challenged that claim. The rejoinder it provides, though, is not to dispel the claim, but to instead point the finger at secularist regimes.

I've been known to say that some secularist ideologies provide excuses to justify murder, while religion provides actual motivation. For instance, this essay pointed out that

"The fact is that more than 100 million human beings were killed by secularist regimes and ideologies in the last century."

This is accurate. At the same time, does such a secularist ideologist say 'Oh my goodness, there is no God! That makes me want to kill innocents!' Not exactly. Does a religious fanatic say 'Oh my goodness, I get dozens of virgins of my own if I destroy evil westerners! That makes me want to kill evil westerners!' Actually, yes.

However, it is not the religion or even the fact that this person is religious that deserves condemnation. The individual who wants to kill others in the name of his religion is simply operating on evil desires. He was not raised responsibly - he was told that killing others for the greater good of God was a good thing to do. When a religion teaches such things, we can criticize such a teaching, and the religion for teaching such a thing.

Bigotry is morally impermissible. Classifying all religious people in one bunch and calling them nutcases is inadvisable and, more importantly, false. Blaming them for all atrocities in the past (the strawman that the essayist raised in his introduction) is very inaccurate as well.

Just One More Motivating Factor
There are enough motivating factors for evil. Religious and secular people alike experience drives for power, money, fame... these things are not just excuses that 'allow' people to justify their evil actions - these are reasons for action. Religious beliefs can provide similar reasons for action.

Remember, though, that desires are what drive people to action. Beliefs shape what people do to accomplish those desires.

My parents are both religious people, but their convictions do not cause them to do evil. In fact, they're both basically saints. The reason for that is that their desires drive them to do good things: to provide for their children, to help others, to promote cooperation in the community, to responsibly educate, to exhibit honesty and integrity. Their beliefs influence how they go about this. My mom told me the other day that she originally wanted to enter the ministry because she 'wanted to help people.' She didn't - she's an educator - but this goes to show that she was raised with the desire to help people, and the belief that religion was necessary to fulfill that desire.

That right there is another reason to criticize religious teaching - the indoctrination that only religion provides a path to helping others and/or behaving ethically. Some teachings are good, admittedly - the poor and the helpless are to be helped, peace is an ideal, self-control and honesty... so criticize the teaching, rather than the religion or the religious.

Ultimately
To the author of the essay: The title of your essay was 'Religion is not to Blame,' yet you did nothing to demonstrate this. You simply pointed a finger and said 'Well, secularist ideologies killed more people!' If this was your point, then yes, religion is still to blame. Just because something else killed more does not make the other more blameworthy. Cancer and AIDS have killed more; does that excuse the actions of religious and secular persecutors?

Value-Laden Terms in Everyday Language

2007-07-15T10:30:00.000-07:00

I don't usually listen to Nickelback where I can avoid it, but the lyrics of the song "Animals" caught my attention. The song is about sneaking out with a sexy girl and gettin' down without the parents being any the wiser. Chorus goes

No, we're never gonna quit
Ain't nothing wrong with it
Just acting like we're animals

Nobody reads this blog yet, but for those who might, you'll have noticed that I'm very concerned with how language is used. Consider the use of "it's just______." We hear that sort of phrase all of the time.

Concerning abortion, we hear "It's just a bunch of cells."
I hear Christians say "well, if evolution is true, then your mind is just a bunch of neurons firing."
In this song, the phrase is "Ain't nuthin' wrong with it, we're just a couple animals."

Value
These phrases are all the sort that describes a phenomenon with the intention of devaluing it. I don't care if the result of sperm+egg is 'just a bunch of cells.' Every living thing is 'just a bunch of cells.' However, the way our minds work, using this sort of phrase devalues the object of the conversation in the mind of the listener.

So what if the mind is 'just a bunch of neurons firing?' It's a fact, whether or not you believe in God, and that fact in no way diminishes the trustworthiness of our minds. When put in those terms, though, the speaker is trying to devalue the object.

Similarly, in the Nickelback song, the singer is trying to justify his actions by saying 'we're just a couple animals.' That's fine - in fact, it's completely true. We're all animals, though, and that fact has no bearing on right and wrong. However, the assumption in many human minds is that animals are of a lesser moral quality than humans, so if we're animals, then any action that an animal would perform is permissible. However, that is not the case. While it's true that many animals are much more civil towards members of their own species than humans are to our own, some animals eat their mates after copulating. Hopefully this is not a permissible thing for human beings to do.

It's false to say 'X is just ____, according to you, therefore your perspective is false.' That's obvious. Using that sort of unspoken line of reasoning, though, has a strong impact on the average listener, who may be of the sort of mindset where if a statement is unappealing, it is disregarded. It's best saved for another post, but people have to deal with reality - it is possible, if not common, for people to think 'I want there to be an afterlife. I didn't get a fair life, so there must be one,' and they'll believe it as if their belief makes any difference to reality. I may revisit this thought later.

A Further Example
One other example bears mentioning. On a Facebook discussion board this morning, I responded to an interesting claim. A young man made the perfectly valid claim that scientific claims can't exactly be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt. He then provided Webster's definition of faith (firm belief in something for which there is no proof). Since there is no proof for scientific claims, he said "There is evidence for evolution. There is no proof however. Thus, evolution (among some other things), like religion, must be taken on faith."

This is a pretty simple syllogism:
1. There is no proof for scientific theories
2. A belief without proof is faith.
3. Therefore, science, like religion, is based on faith.

Unfortunately, there is a little bit of a problem here. He presented 'proof' as certainty beyond a shadow of doubt. He pointed out that experiments exist that could disprove the Second Law of Thermodynamics, for instance. What he may not have realized is that experiments exist that could disprove nearly everything. For instance, nobody can prove 'beyond a shadow of doubt' that reality has existed for more than 5 minutes. In the sort of capacity he uses 'proof,' every single belief a person has is faith.

But that's not how faith is normally used, and it's not the impression that his words conveyed. Had he used the dictionary to understand the word, he would have found that 'proof' is defined thus: "evidence sufficient to establish a thing as true." For example, in our justice system, people are 'proven' guilty or innocent - beyond a reasonable doubt (scientific conclusions, likewise, are beyond a reasonable doubt).

So, is there a word to distinguish between the 'faith' that plants photosynthesize, and the 'faith' that there is an afterlife? Well, I'd like to think so. In fact, I'll call a propositional attitude regarding a statement a "belief," such an attitude based on solid evidence "sound belief" and such an attitude based on no such evidence (or in spite of evidence to the contrary) faith.

Using the word faith as this fellow did is a bad idea. I'm not sure he recognizes it yet, but when 'faith' is used to describe scientific theories, the automatic assumption is not the correct one - that 'faith' has been expanded to mean every single belief a human being has - the assumption is that scientific theories are not built on solid evidential foundations. This leads to similar devaluation by the average listener.

Many people think of 'rhetoric' to mean 'saying something without saying anything.' That's exactly what this person did - whether or not he recognized that, I'm not sure though, so I won't jump to that conclusion and condemn his actions.

Ultimately
The point to take away from all of this is that often a phenomenon is described in a way that casts it negatively, just to try to devalue a certain perspective. Don't fall for it. Question the motives of the speaker. If he is trying to deceive or confuse, he is worthy of moral condemnation.

PS I should mention that I'll use 'he' in most of my examples. Our language is regrettably lacking in the sort of terminology that would allow me to be gender-neutral in that sort of case (without being ponderous, anyway). I may switch and use 'she' every now and then just to throw the reader off :)

Colorado - Threats, and how to Respond

2007-07-10T12:06:00.000-07:00

I found a link in a post on Pharyngula today to an article in the Denver Post. The article described a situation today where

"University of Colorado police are investigating a series of threatening messages and documents e-mailed to and slipped under the door of evolutionary biology labs on the Boulder campus."

A religious-affiliated group (undisclosed by the police) identified itself in the messages. Police Commander Brad Wiesley summarized the notes as basically saying "Anybody who doesn't believe in our religious belief is wrong and should be taken care of."

"What's written on paper is what's written on paper," Wiesley said, voicing a belief I share with and attribute to Alonzo Fyfe that the proper response to words is words; to legislation is legislation; to action is action. In this situation, what has been exchanged is not only words, but threats. The phrase 'taken care of,' in this context, cannot be mistaken for anything but a threat - especially when the content of the messages was apparently strong enough to prompt a police investigation.

A threat is a suggestion of action. I believe a police investigation and, hopefully, punishment, is the proper response to these events.

This sort of action is deserving of a great deal of condemnation from both the religious and the secular community. It is unacceptable to threaten educators for teaching a widely accepted theory that does not cause any harm. It is the University of Colorado staff's right to teach in peace - and, I'd argue, responsibility to teach the theory of evolution.

In true rhetorical fashion, don't expect the organizations that decry, for instance, perceived bias against ID advocates in higher education, or that claim Christianity is persecuted in America, to make any mention of this event. The more responsible Christian groups that hear about this article will take the time to at least wag a finger at the group making the threats. I'll be interested to see what develops.

In other news, the Denver Post entertained me with a story of a 2-acre fire ignited by a flaming bird.

Trusting Others

2007-07-03T14:29:00.000-07:00

I just enjoyed an essay on Eyewitness Testimony and Memory, thanks to Austin Cline over at About.com. It ended with this quote by Elizabeth Loftus in Memory: Surprising New Insights into How We Remember and Why We Forget:

“Memory is imperfect. This is because we often do not see things accurately in the first place. But even if we take in a reasonably accurate picture of some experience, it does not necessarily stay perfectly intact in memory. Another force is at work. The memory traces can actually undergo distortion. With the passage of time, with proper motivation, with the introduction of special kinds of interfering facts, the memory traces seem sometimes to change or become transformed. These distortions can be quite frightening, for they can cause us to have memories of things that never happened. Even in the most intelligent among us is memory thus malleable.”

It made me want to mention two important thoughts.

First is the idea that if God exists, It would make the faith so dependent on witness and testimony. See, that makes very little sense to me. One would imagine that God would be more concerned with people trusting It, rather than other people.

The second is about the importance of testimony. Aristotle noted in his Rhetoric that, whatever its reliability may be, testimony plays a large role in persuasion - and this is a sentiment that has resurfaced to lead a few modern rhetoricians to delve deeper into the role of ethos in persuasion. As Aristotle pointed out,

"It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses." - Rhetoric, Book I, Part 2, 350 BCE

All things considered, it's not surprising that people immediately trust the eyewitness accounts of those they trust, admire, or see no reason not to trust. Unless a listener has a strong reason to doubt a story, he/she will almost certainly believe it. What reason did the superstitious Mediterranean world have to doubt that the leader of one messianic cult had ascended from the dead into Heaven? What reason does the modern layperson have to doubt what their trusted preacher has to say about the theory of evolution, especially when packaged so convincingly?

Glenn Miller addresses ultimate motives

2007-06-27T22:10:00.000-07:00

A series of links led me to an (dated) article that JP Holding challenged Sam Harris to respond to. Being the relative newcomer to these online joustings that I am, I have no idea whether or not Harris took it upon himself to get back to him (and I don't know enough about Holding to know whether or not he's a worthy adversary). Well, the article deals with a Christian justification of the problem of evil, and I think I'll do my best to respond. The article is by Glenn Miller.

1. Here is how the original question was posed. Miller responded to a reader's subsequent question "Isn't that cruel?":

"At the outset God made this into a life-and-death situation. God staked the entire future of mankind on this one event. We lost. The moment that Adam and Eve ate that fruit, wheels were set in motion that would ultimately result in the doom of mankind. Without some kind of intervention from God we would all be damned. God does promise to intervene, but it's like building a nuclear bomb and setting it to go off in a large city at 12:00. Then, when all of the people of the city come to you for mercy, you disarm it for them. Does that make you a hero for disarming it or a lunatic for building it in the first place? The whole thing was orchestrated to make us feel dependent upon God. That says a lot about God's character."

2. The impossibility of coming up with a decisive answer

Miller correctly notes that "If we are not able to discover a motive for God's decision to [create the universe], then we will not be justified in judging that unknown motive to be either adequately good or to be insufficient."

As an aside, this is a complicating issue that simultaneously makes the 'God' hypothesis an absolutely impossible one to disprove, and renders the hypothesis irrelevant for scientific study as well. Imagine this sort of conversation:

Jack: If the earth is just a few thousand years old, then why does it appear ancient?
Jill: God did it - but we can't know why; His motives are sometimes a mystery.
Jack: But isn't that deceitful?
Jill: Who are we to judge what 'deceitful' is? God's motives are sometimes a mystery, so somehow it's not deceitful.

Hopefully it's quite clear why the problem of evil is so difficult to impress upon the practiced believer. It's of more ease (and perhaps importance) to consider the more readily defined ideas of justice or love... but I'll save that for later.

3. What's the question?

The person who penned the original question meant to argue that the idea of the Christian God does not = the idea of a good god. Since 'Christian God' must, by definition, = 'Good God,' we can see what his argument was: The idea of the Christian God is not good. He was NOT claiming 'God exists' and then saying '...but He is evil!' as Miller interprets the situation. More on this later.

Of course, the original article (which I was unable to find) seems to have made a point of questioning why God placed the magical trees in the garden, why the magical serpent tested Adam & Eve when they had no knowledge of right and wrong, etc, but I won't write about that just yet either.

4. Understanding 'good' and 'evil' in the problem of evil

Language is arbitrary. For those who haven't considered this directly, it should make abundant sense that the word 'cat' only means 'cat' among people who agree on that meaning. So, when we're talking about the problem of evil, we can't make any sense unless we agree on the meaning of 'evil.' Otherwise, you could be talking about 'morally wrong or bad; immoral; wicked,' as dictionary.com suggests, while I'm talking about 'a loaf of bread' (unlikely... but you see the point).

Miller addresses that problem early on:

"We must note that, in the first question, we (somewhat insignificant 'carbon-based life forms') are presuming to judge God's morality and character on the basis of our own! For a human being, with the incredible paucity of data we have about the universe, morality, reality, and complexity, to decide that God is less kind, less noble, less compassionate, less moral, less 'humane' than they, seems quite bizarre, in my opinion."

On whose basis, then, are we to judge? Miller should recognize a few things:

First, if we can't criticize God, then we can't know if God is good. Here's how such an attempt would go:

Hansel: God is great, God is good! Let's bring Jesus to the neighborhood!
Gretel: How do you know God only does good things?
Hansel: Because God is good!
Gretel: What is 'good?'
Hansel: Whatever God does, because God only does good!
Gretel: All you're telling me is that God does what God does.

With that sort of approach, the word 'good' is pointless - rather than saying 'God is good,' you may as well say 'God is God' for all the information the statement conveys. It is a tautology. Clearly, we need to have some idea of what 'good' means if we are to make sense of the statement 'God is good.'

Fortunately, the Bible provides some clarity. Traditional Christianity describes God not only as omnipotent, omniscient and omni-benevolent, but a) Loving, b) Just, c) Self-sacrificing, etc. Miller adds "good, merciful, kind, benevolent, and interested in the welfare of all His creatures, great and small." These traits are more easily understood than 'good,' and so easier to test.

Second, he is begging the question. The question is whether or not a good God exists, and in the above passage, Miller assumes that one does. Now remember, since we're talking about the idea of the Christian God, we're assuming a being that is omnipotent, omniscient and omni-benevolent.

If our analysis (which, to be meaningful, must proceed from an agreed definition of 'good,' other than 'that which God would do') does not produce a god that is all-good, then we do not have a god that matches the description of the Christian God, and the argument is over.

For Miller to say that we are 'presuming' to judge God's character is to already assume that the idea of God we're questioning exists. The skeptic quoted at the beginning of this post was NOT arguing that a god exists that created morally superior beings than itself. He is arguing that the theology/philosophy behind the idea of God is not compatible with what we can describe as a good God.

Let me state that again: The theology/philosophy behind the idea of God is not compatible with what we can describe as a good God. Remember that we have to understand 'good' and 'evil' outside of 'what God would or would not do' in order to meaningfully describe God as 'good.'

If 'good' is just 'what God would or would not do,' then the skeptic quoted at the beginning of this post was simply arguing 'How could God do that which God could not do?' A Christian can simply respond by saying 'Well, that's impossible... so our understanding of what God could do must be lacking.' However, such a response derives from a misunderstanding of the point of the argument - rather than assuming [A good God exists] -> Let's figure out how to make His actions all be good, the problem of evil assumes nothing, and then -> Let's figure out if a good god exists.

5. Desire Utilitarianism Lite

Desire utilitarianism is a theory that assumes the absence of the supernatural or of any overarching established moral code, which makes it difficult to analyze God... but if we were to take the 'idea' of God and apply desire utilitarianism, it may yield some insights.

Desires are the objects of moral criticism ('good' and 'evil')
Good desires are those that tend to fulfill the desires of others (promoting welfare generally)
Good actions are those which a person with good desires would act upon
Good and evil desires are discovered by a scientific sort of evaluation as to which desires would objectively tend to fulfill those of others - a list of such desires would include empathy, compassion; it would exclude the desire to harm others, to hate; to kill.

6. Determinism - more misunderstanding

Miller spends a good deal of time berating 'the skeptic' for being too deterministic. However, the skeptic was not assuming that everything would be a 'first domino fell over, hitting the next one, and the next one' kind of circumstance. Since he assumed 'omniscience' in the idea of the Christian God he was arguing against, he was merely noting that such a God would know beforehand the events which would transpire on earth. This is not predeterminism, and I believe Miller wasted his words here. The skeptic simply assumed that God didn't bring the universe into existence under the naive belief that everything would work out perfectly. For many theological reasons I could outline, but decline to do so for space-saving purposes, this is a valid assumption to make.

So far...

Miller's response is too long to draw a very thorough breakdown from me. He spent most of the rest of the letter trying to explain why various examples people pose as cruelties imposed by the Almighty are not as bad as one might think. So far, it's done nothing to answer the basic question - nothing at all. Miller has assumed the Bible to be true; then assumed God to be morally good; then taken the appropriate measures to interpret the Bible thus... in so doing, he happened to mention (by way of contrasting the plague on Egypt) various other plagues of the ancient world that accounted for hundreds of thousands of horrible deaths all over the Middle East. All of this, presumably, was foreseen by God. Why go ahead with the plan, then?

7. Postulating a motive

Very simply, if God was ever once the only entity in existence, and God is all-good, clearly it is possible for good to exist without evil. If God is all-powerful, then God does not need love, companionship, help etc. In fact, if God did need love, He could always rely on those other aspects of His tri-unity (Hey Jesus, wanna shoot some pool?).

A) A universe can exist without suffering or evil
B) An all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing God can exist alone
C) Therefore, the existence of suffering and evil is not necessary. It was derived from a conscious decision which was not made for the benefit of those created - since those creations would wind up "enduring a life of hardship and pervasive suffering [whereupon] most humans will end up in Hell, where they will be actively tortured forever and ever."

It's a common response for a Christian to postulate that there is some overarching good to explain the evil. I challenge them to postulate ANY single reason God would have for creating the universe.

8. Greater good

There could be some 'greater good' that demands the creation of this universe. For example, there could be another universe in which two people get to go to Heaven for every person in this universe that burns in Hell. This assumes that there is a price/exchange rate for every soul - in fact, what if the majority of humans who go to Hell simply go there so a few can get to Heaven? Maybe we're sacrificed because we're only worth, collectively, as much as the Christians who go to Heaven.

The latter proposition falls apart. First it assumes that some humans are more valuable than others, which the principle of justice precludes - unless there is some aspect of those humans that is intrinsically more valuable. Maybe it's their ability to have blind faith. If so, then the creation of the humans who only believe what evidence supports (or those who put their blind faith in the wrong god!) is a blatant injustice. If God is just, then that scenario is not true.

If God has created other beings of more intrinsic value than humans, then what? I'd argue that God's values would be in direct conflict with our own - and if we're defining 'good' in terms of the general wellfare of human beings, then that argument has run into a roadblock as well.

So is it all, as the Iron Maiden song says, "For the Greater Good of God?"

9. Foreknowledge

Miller brings up the philosophical question of what can be foreknown at all. Just as 'omnipotence' does not mean God can make a burrito so hot He can't eat it, omniscience doesn't necessarily mean that God would know what would befall mankind...

It gets a little complicated here. Supposedly, God doesn't have 'free will' like humans do (in Christian theology), because God is limited to those actions that are good. God's character is described as good, so we know that God can only do things His character allows. His character apparently allowed Him to create humans - with the ability to freely choose evil (what God's character wouldn't allow God to do).

An all-knowing God, even without the gift of foresight, couldn't fail to recognize the inevitability of evil. That can't be good... that God's character would allow Him to create evil is very similar to the idea that if one hires a mercenary to murder somebody else, that person is culpable as much as the mercenary is.

Furthermore, an all-knowing God couldn't give the order to 'go forth and multiply' while assuming that humans with a lifetime of ~1,000 years living a life of 0% infant mortality, no natural disasters, no predation, disease, poison, and a limited ecosystem would be happy for long.

Oh no, it's pretty clear that even without foreknowledge, an all-knowing God would be privy to the understanding of certain inevitabilities.

"What we need to do at this point is to come up with a set of criteria which would warrant the continuance of a plan that included foreknown suffering."

Miller thought up four criteria.

1) There must be more 'good' than 'bad.'
2) The lives of the good and evil intertwine inseperably (what happens to one affects the other)
3) Nobody is discriminated against - we are all treated fairly
4) The evil does not ultimately thwart God's intention to bless the good

He decided to approach each of these criteria independently. I'll summarize and criticize in another massive conglomerate, but it's time for me to hit the hay.

Insight into Faith

2007-06-24T12:37:00.000-07:00

"A faith is not acquired by reasoning. One does not fall in love with a woman, or enter the womb of a church, as a result of logical persuasion. Reason may defend an act of faith - but only after the act has been committed, and the man committed to the act. Persuasion may play a part in a man's conversion; but only the part of bringing to its full and conscious climax a process which has been maturing in regions where no persuasion can penetrate. A faith is not acquired; it grows like a tree.

From the psychologist's point of view, there is little difference between a revolutionary and a traditionalist faith. All true faith is uncompromising, radical, purist; hence the true traditionalist is always a revolutionary zealot in conflict with pharisaian society, with the lukewarm corrupters of the creed. And vice versa: the revolutionary's Utopia, which in appearance represents a complete break with the past, is always modeled on some image of the lost Paradise, of a legendary Golden Age...

Thus all true faith involves a revolt against the believer's social environment, and a projection into the future of an ideal derived from the remote past. All Utopias are fed from the sources of mythology; the social engineer's blueprints are merely revised editions of the ancient text."

Arthur Koestler penned these words in the 1949 book The God that Failed. It was a collection of six essays by famous ex-Communists. I found the text to be very relevant today. The author's membership of the Communist party was the result of an acquired faith - a 'region where no persuasion may penetrate.' What a sad prophecy of fundamentalism in our society. Now I need to read further, to understand how he broke the hold of this 'future ideal derived from the remote past.'

Rhetorical Analysis - Ultimate Words in the Abortion Dispute

2007-06-22T10:57:00.000-07:00

When two sides are in direct dispute over a topic, their stance is often labeled appropriately: pro-war vs anti-war; pro-gay marriage vs anti-gay marriage. In only one contemporary debate is there a situation where one issue has two conflicting 'pro' sides. Abortion rights is the battle between 'pro-life' vs 'pro-choice.'

These terms are 'ultimate words,' according to Richard Weaver, one of the preeminent rhetorical ethicists of the century. 'Ultimate words' are used to direct our passions toward favoring one side or another; to shape the way we look at the subject.

Both sides of the abortion debate use loaded language, which doesn't help to move our passions in the way that a responsible rhetorician should.

Value-laden terminology
Weaver's discussion of 'ultimate words' distinguishes between 'god' terms and 'devil' terms. In America, there is a positive association with words like 'progress,' 'democracy,' 'freedom' and 'justice,' and a negative connotation with 'reactionary,' 'fascist' and 'militant.'

More pointedly, there is a positive association with words like 'life' and 'choice,' and a negative with 'killing babies' and 'forced pregnancy/childbirth.'

Weaver had a somewhat traditional view of rhetoric - 'addressing itself to the most important of all ends, the persuading of human beings to adopt right attitudes and act in response to them.' The sort of attitude generated by the particular use of 'ultimate words' by opposing parties in the abortion debate is not very helpful to understanding the arguments in regards to the issue.

Certainly nearly everybody is 'pro-life' in most circumstances. You won't find many people in the general public who are 'against' life... but that is the connotation implied when those opposed to abortion use the term. People are essentially told that 'if you value human life, you must side with us. If you side with them, you don't value human life.'

The other side does the same thing, through its choice of words. Nearly everybody is 'pro-choice' in most regards in this democracy, particularly, ironically enough, the Republicans who usually stand on the other side. Yet when the value-laden terminology of 'pro-choice' is used by the pro-abortion rights side, the public automatically gets the assumption that those who disagree with abortion rights aren't concerned with allowing people to make their own choices with regards to their bodies. Making independent choices is an important American value - a 'god' term in our culture.

Language is sermonic

Weaver is probably most famous for his claim that language is sermonic; that people engaging in rhetoric are preachers.

"Finally, we must never lose sight of the order of values as the ultimate sanction of rhetoric. No one can live a life of direction and purpose without some scheme of values. As rhetoric confronts us with choices involving values, the rhetorician is a preacher to us, noble if he tries to direct our passion to noble ends, and base if he uses our passion to confuse and degrade us."

The use of value-laden language to cast two opposing sides as noble is quite simply the oldest form of argument on earth. In this case, using 'pro-life' and 'pro-choice' amounts to a pathetic appeal - an argument from pathos. Pathos is the third of Aristotle's artistic proofs (Ethos: perceived character of the speaker, and Logos: logical syllogism, are the other two).

The passions are being stirred by using value-laden language that suggests 'We support life. They support killing babies.' Or 'We support the right to make our own choices. They think important life decisions should be forced down our throats.' This is not the same as trying to 'direct our passion to noble ends.'

Pathos, Phaedras, and the noble rhetorician
"The office of rhetoric is advising men," wrote Richard Weaver. In his analysis of Plato's Phaedras, he points out that the dialogue between Socrates and Phaedras was written to describe the difference between a noble and a base rhetorician.

"Sophistications of theory cannot obscure the truth that there are but three ways for language to affect us. It can move us toward what is good; it can move us toward what is evil; or, in a hypothetical third place, fail to move us at all."

The analogy Plato made was between a lover and a rhetorician. A lover can treat you in a dispassionate way - as an object or in a carefree manner, in a way that manipulates your emotions and uses you for his/her own benefit, or in a way that focuses on meeting your needs, on self-sacrifice and mutual trust. A speaker, likewise, can be dispassionate and boring, can manipulate your emotions to promote his/her own benefit, or - this is the 'noble lover,' or 'noble rhetorician,' can speak in a way that 'persuades human beings to adopt right attitudes and act in response to them.'

We have an obligation to use language responsibly. 'But any utterance is a major assumption of responsibility,' as Weaver concludes. Using loaded language will always have ramifications. Be careful.

Hugh Ross and Reasons to Believe

2007-06-21T22:04:00.001-07:00

It's dated, but I was presented with a transcript of a presentation by Dr. Hugh Ross, founder of the Reasons to Believe 'Science-Faith Think Tank.' Delivered on April 16th, 1994, 'New Scientific Evidence for the Existence of God' nevertheless indicates some interesting details about the organization.

I have a few comments.

Ross, despite his education, seems startlingly unable to recognize sound logic.

"Through the principle of positive fact, if the universe has a beginning, it must have a beginner, hence the existence of God."

Now, it may just be that I'm unfamiliar with the term 'principle of positive fact, but what I see is this:

1. All beginnings have a beginner.
2. The universe has a beginning.
3. Therefore, the universe has a beginner.
4. That beginner is God.

The first premise requires a little elaboration, and there is an unjustified leap of logic between (3) and (4). Still, it's clearly just a basic rephrasing of the age-old cosmological argument. Premise (1) only stands if by 'beginner' Ross means 'cause.' For instance, if I say 'since an avalanche has a beginning, it must have a beginner,' I am only correct in the sense that something triggered the avalanche. 'Beginner' implies someone, which is, at best, something Ross overlooked, but more likely just meaning-laden language used rhetorically in an irresponsible fashion.

While there is still debate over the validity of the cosmological argument for a creator (which I won't bother detailing right now, but will direct you to a useful description here), what is certain is that to say that 'the universe has a cause' is NOT the same as saying that 'it has an intelligent, thinking, planning Cause.' All we know is that a series of events caused a beginning to time and space - as we know it, in this universe. The leap from this conclusion to 'thus, God' is unwarranted. It is at least unsatisfactorily explained in the presentation.

"Any entity confined to half of the line of time, must have a beginning and must be created. I can walk home tonight, and that's it. It's the simplest, most rigorous proof of the existence of God."

By way of counter-example, here are a few other options for an entity confined to half of the line of time (only able to move 'forward' in the dimension of time we experience):
1. The entity was, at one point, able to use any line of time, and has since lost those abilities.
2. The entity existed outside of time, and then became subject to that dimension (Jesus Christ, as Ross must have forgotten)
3. The entity was brought into existence by non-intelligently-designing factors.

I'm not pushing any of these as a legitimate argument - that's not the issue at hand. I simply want to demonstrate Ross' failures at grasping logical arguments.

Ross oversteps the boundaries of his education, making him both intellectually arrogant, and negligent

Let me be the first to admit that Ross is a well-credentialed man. His B.Sc. (1967) in Physics, University of British Columbia, Ma.Sc. (1968) in Astronomy, University of Toronto and Ph.D. (1973) in Astronomy, University of Toronto clearly show that he is educated. However, it is these very credentials that point to a more sinister side to his ministry.

"All we have is evidence that a certain species exists for a certain period of time without significant change, which then goes extinct to be replaced at a different time with a radically different species, with no connection from the previous species to the next one."

Ross is in no position to give educated commentary on the theory of evolution. He may be considered a scientist, but his area of expertise is not in a field relevant to allow him to be an authority on fossil record evidence, or biological evolution in general. As an educated scientist, he should know this - and he exhibits intellectual arrogance and a disregard for accurate knowledge in attempting to cast himself as an authority before an audience unqualified to criticize his claims.

Of course, he is flat-out wrong, too , and he derives his statements from a flat-out misunderstanding of biological evolution. So I don't carry on too long, I'll refer readers to check the accuracy of his statements at Talk.Origins, the American Scientific Affiliation, or UC Berkley's Understanding Evolution page.

In reference to hominid fossils:

"...there's no relationship between those bipedal primates and human beings."

Today, we know that 'at this functional genetic level humans and chimpanzees are more similar to each other than either is to any of the other apes.' While this information was not expressly available at the time of Ross' presentation, to say that there is 'no relationship' between one primate genus and another cannot be considered an accurate statement. Of course, those who have studied hominid fossils extensively and submitted their findings to rigorous peer-review believe that there is indeed a strong relationship between these primate fossils and both humans and the common ancestor shared by some modern apes.

Ross has no expertise when it comes to evolutionary theory, and when somebody schooled in science presumes to offer a professional opinion on a different branch of science, that somebody is either being deceitful or... well, that's pretty much the only option. He's too smart to be doing anything other than intentionally misleading his audience.

Ross is willing to use baseless numbers and present them as fact

"There were 30,000 land mammals on planet Earth when God created Adam and Eve. There are only 15,000 remaining today. In just a few thousand years, 15,000 species of mammals have disappeared."

It's important to remember that there is a difference between facts discovered by scientists and scientific theories. Of course, I don't know how he possibly arrived at the 30,000 number. Modern estimates put the number of mammal species at around 5,000. His faulty statistics also say that even without human impact on earth, one (mammal) species would go extinct every year. However, only 82 mammal species have gone extinct, to our knowledge, in the last 500.

I suspect that the 'one per year' number refers to animal species as a whole... showing, again, not only Ross' inability to provide authoritative commentary on the biological sciences, but his negligence for saying what he did.

Ross, and other 'intelligent design' advocates, depend heavily on arguments from complexity

"What does this tell me about the Creator? That God so loved the human race that he went to the expense of building one hundred billion stars... so that for this brief moment in time, we could have a nice place to live."

That's not what it tells me. I understand the the universe is complicated - incredibly so. However, consider for a moment the motives for an all-powerful being to create a universe. From the way Christians present God, It would presumably create a universe for the habitation of human beings, for the sake of making something complex, beautiful, and reflective of Its characteristics, or some combination of the two.

If the point of the universe is to host human life, then it is a monumental waste. From our experience of intelligent designers (humans), a system designed to work should exhibit signs of simplicity - the more simple the design, the less can go wrong. God could have made a tiny 'universe' consisting of only our planet. In fact, there is evidence that the Bible authors held to this view. It would make even more sense, of course, for God to have created a universe for every individual - Christians will remind you that your relationship with God is the only important one, so why shouldn't it be the only one? Besides, that would pretty much eradicate 'sin,' which usually relies on situations with more than one being.

But most Christians propose something a little different, which helps to explain the seeming pointlessness of a vast universe - God wanted to make something complex, beautiful, and reflective of Its characteristics. However, I'm fairly certain that if an all-powerful God wanted to really make a complex universe, for complexity's sake, then It could make one vastly MORE complicated than this. Certainly we wouldn't expect it to be mostly empty space, filled with background radiation and almost completely hostile to life.

Why I consider the argument from complexity pointless

Any given hand in a poker game is vastly improbable - yet once you've been dealt that hand, to question the odds of having been dealt it is unreasonable. More pointedly, consider the odds that you exist, here and now - as an individual. Each sperm has something like a 1 in 20,000,000 chance of fertilizing an egg. Account for other variables - that your parents would decide to do the naughty thing on a particular day, at a particular time, in a particular place; that they'd even find one another; that THEY would be born...

The chances that you would come to exist were very slim. However, now that you are born, the chances have become 100%. The same is true of the universe... just because the numbers thought up by mathematicians make it seem unlikely that the universe came about at all doesn't change the fact that it did - and it wasn't much more unlikely than the fact that you are reading this right now.

The presentation fails to deliver

I was led to believe by its title that this presentation would give scientific evidence for the existence of God. What I got was facts discovered by scientists (not necessarily science), along with bogus/false 'scientific' conclusions (not related to hypothesizing God), and pointless mathematical calculations. This does not amount to scientific evidence for the existence of God in any way, shape, or form.

More specifically, the presentation began with this statement:

"The hallmark of a truly reliable scientific theory is that it is thoroughly testable, scientifically falsifiable, and makes accurate predictions."

NOTHING he presented regarding God was falsifiable in theory, or had the ability to make predictions. This presentation is, at best, misleading - as the audience assumes that the opening statement is true (which it is) and then nods along as facts discovered by scientists (NOT the same as 'scientific theories') are presented. This presentation has more straw men than a cornfield, leading me to the firm conclusion that, given the credentials of the speaker, the presentation is deliberately deceitful.

I have to end with a strong moral slap on the hand for a scientist who should be held in deep disregard by honest people. Nevermind that modern Christianity extols honesty as a virtue. Nevermind that other Christian organizations like Answers in Genesis and the Institute for Creation Research are far more culpable.

The question is whether or not the 'Hugh Ross' sort of person is the type we should welcome as part of society. Imagine, if you will, a presidential administration that exerts a great deal of power over the American public. Since it holds that position, it is assumed to know what it's talking about - people trust it initially in its decisions and claims. It then takes that trust and runs with it, making wild assumptions not based on fact, and assuming it knows the truth even when there is no reason for it to do so (like when it invades Iraq and then ignores the results of the Iraq Study Group). It conjures false reasons and presents them as fact. Overall, it fails to live up to what is expected - required, actually - of it. This sort of presidential administration is deserving of all sorts of criticism. It is the sort of administration that should be fought through legislation and proper application of the law.

Dr. Hugh Ross represents a group that exerts a great deal of power over the American public - in the role of Christian leader. People trust him when he makes decisions and claims because he is a scientist. However, he takes his perceived (but undeserved) authority to other subjects and makes wild claims not based on fact, and assumes he knows the truth... although facts indicate otherwise. He claims to present science, but fails to live up to his claim.

He willingly deceives, misleads, assumes his conclusions true even when un-credentialed to make them. He demonstrates a blatant disregard for truth and reasoned criticism. The sort of desires that Ross operates on are the sort that lead to bad decisions and harmful consequences, as we see from the example of the Bush administration. The sort of desires that Ross operates on are demonstrably the type that tend to thwart the desires of others, and should be outspokenly denounced.

Forensics and evolutionary theory

2007-06-17T15:04:00.000-07:00

There is an old and tiresome Creationist claim out there which says that theories of evolution are not scientific because they can't be repeated or tested. Such a claim states that since nobody was around to directly observe the transition from amphibians to reptiles, for instance, that to theorize such a scenario is not scientific.

A thought struck me as a good way to explain why such a claim is false. Before I do, however, I'd like to point out that much of the groundwork for evolutionary theories has indeed been directly observed in recorded human history. Random mutations do occur and are selected for when beneficial to organisms in their particular environment. Transitional fossils occur in the geologic column in a manner consistent with the predictions that evolutionary theories make. You can learn more by clicking on the Talk.origins link in the FYI section of this blog. Pay special attention to the '29+ Evidences of Macroevolution.'

I'd like to use the example of forensic science to make the main point here. My intent is to demonstrate why both forensics and biological evolution are valid scientific approaches to knowledge and truth - and to tag on the conclusion that 'God did it' cannot meaningfully be used in the realm of scientific inquiry.

For one thing, forensics provides a great example of how the scientific method works.
1. You observe a phenomenon: A person has died.
2. You formulate and propose a hypothesis for how that series of events came about.
3. You collect data and test the hypothesis against those data.
4. You analyze the results, form conclusions, and either reject the hypothesis or modify it to fit the evidence.
5. If the theory holds up, you run it by a group of people who can view your findings and conclusions, declaring them either valid or invalid.

None of this involves *being there* to directly observe the events. None of the events need to be repeatable. Yet... this is still science. In forensic studies, people collect evidence regarding past events, and they construct a theory to explain the evidence. The same is true of evolutionary theories.

Several important criteria for scientific theories make it clear that 'God did it' cannot be a valid explanation in the realm of science. Most relevant are the ideas that scientific theories must be able to explain past and to predict future phenomena, and that useful scientific theories must be falsifiable.

If we try applying 'God did it' to our murder case, it's clear how useless the theory is. What sort of things would we predict if God did murder the victim? What sort of findings would falsify the theory?

Take a step back for a moment. Imagine instead of 'God did it,' we hypothesize 'Mother Theresa did it.' Well, if she was responsible for the murder, what would we predict to find? We might predict that she had a motive to murder, was in the vicinity when the murder took place, and perhaps left traces of her presence - fingerprints, blood, hair, etc. To falsify the theory, we could prove that Mother Theresa is dead. We could prove that she wasn't in the vicinity, and that she left no traces at the crime scene. More potently, we could prove that another person was in the vicinity and left traces of his or her presence.

The 'God did it' theory is powerless to make predictions. It could include absolutely anything. There is nothing we can do to empirically test the idea, and no possible discoveries or evidences are able to falsify the theory. For those two reasons alone, 'God did it' is a worthless hypothesis to make in the realm of scientific inquiry - whether or not it is true.

Desire Utilitarianism

2007-06-15T17:35:00.000-07:00

This post is here to provide a groundwork for all future discussions of ethics on my blog. When I write about events/concepts, I will be applying the moral meaning theory of desire utilitarianism to evaluate the topic - to the best of my ability. If I happen to disagree with Alonzo Fyfe on the matter, rest assured that the proper application of the theory is his. Mine must be either insufficiently thought out, or born of a misunderstanding of my own.

I found this essay posted by a contributor on a new scratchpad Wiki for desire utilitarianism:

[http://scratchpad.wikia.com/wiki/Desire_Utilitarianism]

I think it gives a concise but thorough description of the theory (complete with original curvy font and formatting). If you'd like further explanation, just ask me.

Desire Utilitarianism

By Richard Chappell (Summarising the moral theory developed by Alonzo Fyfe) [2004]

Overview:

- The focus of moral judgements should concern an agent's desires, rather than his actions.

- Desires are persistent entities.

- Value derives from desire-fulfillment. (There is no value without a valuer.)

- Morality is about maximising value (and hence desire-fulfillment), universally.

- Hence, a good desire is one that will tend to fulfill desires generally, regardless of whose they are. A bad desire is one that will tend to thwart desires generally.

- Morality is subjective in the sense that it depends on minds ('valuers') generally, but it is nevertheless objective from the perspective of any individual.

- An act can be judged on its consistency with how a person with good desires (see definition above) would behave in that situation.

- The Is/Ought gap can be bridged, by noting the general form of the hypothetical imperative: "If you want Y, you ought to do X", is another way of saying "Doing X is such to fulfill the desires in question" (where the desires in question are 'Y'). To extend this to morality, note that the 'desires in question' are all desires, regardless of who has them.

Focus on Desires - BDI Theory

Why focus on desires rather than actions? Because no action occurs in isolation. Instead, they are caused by the beliefs & desires of the agent. This idea is formalised in today's most widely accepted view of human psychology, BDI Theory. To quote Alonzo Fyfe:

(Beliefs + Desires) -> Intention -> Action

It is important to understand that beliefs and desires are both propositional attitudes. That is to say, they express a mental attitude towards a proposition. Furthermore, a proposition is the meaning component of a sentence. "I am eating chocolate cake" and "Alonzo is eating chocolate cake" are two different sentences that happen to express the same proposition (given that I am the Alonzo referred to in the second sentence).

"Agent believes that P" states that Agent has the mental attitude that the proposition P is true.

"Agent desires that P" states that Agent has the mental attitude that the proposition P is to be made or kept true.

BDI theory states that the intentional component of intentional actions (the only type of action we can be held morally accountable for) is strictly determined by our beliefs and desires. If I desire some chocolate cake, and believe that I still have some chocolate cake left over from the birthday party, I form the intention to go downstairs and get the cake, which (barring physical injury) causes the muscle contractions associated with walking downstairs, cutting a piece of cake, and bringing it back up to my computer.

If I do not go downstairs and get a piece of cake, this is because the description of my beliefs and desires is either mistaken or incomplete. Perhaps I do not believe that there is a chocolate cake in the kitchen. Or perhaps I have an aversion to gaining weight that is stronger than my desire for chocolate cake. Either way, the intentional component of my behavior is to be explained in terms of my beliefs and desires.

BDI theory says that we always act to maximize fulfillment of our desires (given our beliefs), but allows that we can have a mix of self-regarding and other-regarding desires. A 'desire that my child is healthy and happy' is as possible as a 'desire that I am having sex with Jenny'. Self-sacrifice springs from our other-regarding desires. An parent's act of sacrifice to benefit his child springs from the agent's desire that P, where P = 'my child is healthy and happy', and the desire that P is a motivating reason to make it the case that P either becomes or remains true. There are times when an agent's other-regarding desires can override all self-regarding desires.

People can even have other-thing-regarding desires such as a desire that a piece of artwork or a historic document be preserved, or a desire to learn some secret of the universe. These are not always done for personal credit.

Yet, in all cases, it is always our own desires that fully govern our actions.

Note the technical definitions used in regard to desires: they are fulfilled if the proposition P is in fact true, and thwarted if the proposition is in fact false. On the other hand, desires are satisfied if the agent believes P is true (regardless of the truth of the matter), and frustrated otherwise. Simple thought experiments demonstrate that people seek desire fulfillment, not mere desire satisfaction (though they may desire the pleasant feeling too, it is a separate desire which may itself be fulfilled).

Desires as Persistent Entities

Our desires remain relatively constant over time (though of course they are subject to change, and some are more long-lived than others). As Alonzo put it: They are not the type of thing that springs forth at a whim to be tucked back into their corner when it is convenient to do so. Every desire weighs on us constantly, and if it is there, its effects will not be confined to this one act alone. This simple fact allows us to overcome the common objections to utilitarianism - for what the usual examples have in common, is that they describe rare scenarios in which (taken in isolation) acting according to bad desires would seem to have the best consequences (e.g. killing an innocent person to appease a rioting mob). However, real life does not occur "in isolation". For someone to have a desire set which allows them to kill innocent people in one scenario, would invariably compromise their behaviour generally.

In this respect, Desire Utilitarianism is similar to Rule Utilitarianism, except that it recognises that the rules are (in a sense) compulsory - wired into the human brain, in the form of "desires". To behave according to Act Utilitarianism is a psychological impossibility, and therefore (because 'ought' implies 'can') it is not the case that we ought to behave according to Act Utilitarianism.

Note also that desires persist even when they are overpowered by other desires. Alonzo Fyfe discusses the example of a man whose bee-allergic son gets stung and will die if he doesn't get treatment fast enough. The father then steals a car in order to drive his son to the hospital in time. He should have an aversion to stealing, but it is overpowered by his desire to save his son. However, that doesn't negate the aversion to stealing - the resistance is still there (like opposing forces in a physics vector), and this will cause the father to return the car and compensate the owner for any inconvenience caused.

Explaining Value

There is no value without a valuer; no intrinsic value in the universe - no 'goodons' and 'badons' to complement protons and electrons. Fortunately, however, there are valuers (us!), so it is possible for objects or states of affairs to be assigned subjective value.

Value is a relationship between an object (or state of affairs) and a specific set of desires.

There are 4 dimensions to all value statements:

(1) A class of objects to be evaluated.

(2) A set of desires to evaluate them against.

(3) Whether the relationship between them is direct ("pleasing") or indirect ("useful").

(4) Whether the object to be evaluated thwarts ("bad") or fulfills ("good") the desires.

As an example, the value tasty evaluates objects put in ones mouth against the desires of the individual doing the tasting. The relationship is a direct one (compare to the value nutritious, which would answer 'indirect' to this question instead), and the desires in question are fulfilled (i.e. it tastes "good").

As Alonzo points out, every value statement follows this same pattern, and moral value is no different:

1) What is being evaluated? Desires themselves. A virtue is nothing more or less than a good desire.

2) What desires are relevant in determining whether a desire is a virtue? All other desires, actually, regardless of who has them. Honesty tends to fulfill other desires. So does compassion.

3) Which types of relationships are relevant? Both direct and indirect relationships are used in determining if a desire is to count as a virtue. Honesty is good not only because an honest person is a wonder to behold, but honesty is generally useful to people generally.

4) It counts as a part of this that a virtue must fulfill desires.

Universality

You may be wondering about the second dimension of moral value as described above - why are all other desires relevant? I think the best answer is simply that there aren't any plausible alternatives, especially when you consider how people talk about "morality". For example, to consider only your own desires, would be called "selfish", not "moral".

To draw a line demarcating those whose desires are relevant to moral consideration from those who are irrelevant would seem unacceptably arbitrary. Likewise, it would be arbitrary to weigh the values of any person or group as being of greater inherent worth than some other person or group.

Which leads us to the intuitively pleasing conclusion that morality is about maximising value universally - that is, a good desire is one that will tend to fulfill other desires generally. Honesty, compassion, and an aversion to killing, are all examples of 'good' desires. Bad desires (e.g. a desire to burn pagans at the stake) have a tendency to thwart other desires generally.

Note that this universality prevents morality from degrading into a relativistic or purely-subjective farce. Because morality is essentially about asking what is "good for everyone", the answer does not depend upon individual beliefs or preferences - it is objective in this sense. It is subjective in the sense that value is relative to desires generally - there is no "absolute" (or "intrinsic") value. Alonzo Fyfe dryly refers to this as objective moral relativism. The concept of "location" serves as an illustrative analogy - any location must always be given relative to some other location (e.g. "the keys are on the table"), yet statements about relative locations can still be objectively true or false.

Judging acts

When a person asks, "What, morally, should I do in this case?", the best interpretation one can give to this question is, "What would a person with good desires do in this case?" Where a 'good desire' is a desire that, if universal, would be such as bring about the greatest fulfillment of all the desires without regard to whose they are.

Acts can be moral, permissible, or immoral, depending on whether a person with good desires would act that way, have no preference, or condemn the action (respectively).

Universality revisited

Here I temporarily depart from Alonzo's theory, and instead elaborate it somewhat with my own ideas. While I fully agree with everything in the Universality section, there is a different sense of universality, that which is described in the Judging acts section, where Alonzo states that "a 'good desire' is a desire that, if universal..." It is that "if universal" bit that I disagree with.

As the theory stands, all 'good' desires are moral duties. They are desires that everyone should have, and so anyone who lacks it may be judged as morally deficient in that respect. However, this leaves no room for supererogation - the concept of a 'good' which is voluntary, rather than a duty (e.g. giving to charity). It also fails to recognise the virtue of harmonious individual differences (e.g. that some people are mathematicians, whilst others are engineers). Currently, individual differences can only be identified as "permissible" (or maybe "bad"), never "good" in their own right, because of that if universal clause (after all, a universal desire to be a theoretical mathematician would result in a world where very few practical advances were achieved!).

My suggestion is to adopt a two-tier approach to morality:

1) Moral duties: this is the compulsory (and universal) side of morality, which is defined as Alonzo stated it: "a 'good desire' is a desire that, if universal, would be such as bring about the greatest fulfillment of all the desires without regard to whose they are."

2) Supererogation: this is the voluntary (and individual) aspect of morality, which could perhaps be defined as follows:
An 'individually-good desire' is a desire that, in that individual, would tend to fulfill desires generally.

This approach would, I believe, allow for greater subtlety and variety of moral thought. It acknowledges the moral worth of individual differences, and allows for a greater breadth of moral choice, rather than insisting that all moral 'goods' are also 'duties', and everything else is merely 'permissible'.

The Is/Ought gap

David Hume proposed that premises purely about how the world 'is' (fact) cannot yield conclusions about how it 'ought' to be (value), and that anyone who attempts to bridge the is/ought gap in such a way must explain how this is to be done.

Alonzo Fyfe responds as follows:

[B]eliefs and desires follow the same pattern. Recall, beliefs + desires yield intentions, which in turn yield actions. One can stack as many beliefs as one wants into a human brain, yet no action is implied about these beliefs. It is like sticking data into a database, no set of data implies that the database should do something. Yet, the instant you add even a single desire to this set, there is a reason to do something. The agent still might not be able to do anything, but he has an understandable reason to do so.

The 'is' portion of the 'is/ought' distinction reflects the 'belief' part of the 'belief/desire' distinction. Correspondingly, the 'ought' portion of the 'is/ought' distinction reflects the 'desire' part of the 'belief/desire' distinction.

But desires are real. They exist in the real world and have influence over the physical movement of matter in the universe. Specifically, they have as their effects the muscle movements that make up human action. Desires -- the embodiment of 'ought' -- exist in the world of the 'is'.

If Agent wants to record that show that comes on in ten minutes, then Agent ought to get the video recorder ready. If Agent wants to graduate from college in four years, then Agent ought to buckle down and study. Once we add a desire to our list of premises, we get an ought conclusion. But the claim, "a desire that X exists" is an 'is' claim. As a premise, it is an 'is' premise. Yet, once added, it allows one to yield 'ought' conclusions.

To summarise: The Is/Ought gap can be bridged, by noting the general form of the hypothetical imperative: "If you want Y, then you ought to do X", is another way of saying "Doing X is such as to fulfill the desires in question" (where the desires in question are 'Y'). To extend this to morality, note that the 'desires in question' are all desires, regardless of who has them.

As Alonzo puts it: 'Ought', in this case, evaluates actions in terms of their ability to fulfill certain desires, either directly or indirectly. Every 'ought' claim, like every value claim, presupposes a set of desires, and asks about the fulfillment of those desires. Every 'ought' claim asks about an 'is' relationship.

References:

Alonzo Fyfe's writings can be found online at the Internet Infidels Discussion Boards. Of particular use to me in compiling this summary:

His formal debate Is Morality Objective? <http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=59835>

The Infidel thread on Utilitarianism <http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=70296>

His 26-chapter series, Ethics Without God: A Personal Journey <http://www.iidb.org/vbb/showthread.php?s=&threadid=46876>

Introduction

2007-06-11T21:26:00.000-07:00

This blog site is just here for fun.

I know that much of the world today isn't fun. I'll write about that. The point is to share with you, my [privileged] readership, the world through my eyes. I want to introduce you to the facts that I've been introduced to, and I want to analyze things in what I hope is an enlightening way. I want to be able to dialogue with people at other blog sites.

To me, 'bigot' is the worst possible curse word that can be applied to a person - when true. With that in mind, if you want to post bigoted comments in response to my blogs, good riddance.

On the bright side, however, I think humans have an obligation to smile and to laugh as much as they can :) That's why I intend to keep y'all updated with fun links and yada yada yada. I may even recommend movies, music etc. I'll be around.

The Locker

How to really lose friends and alienate people

John Loftus - Rejecting Christianity

More about science/atheism

Addressing some questions from last summer

Premises of Desire Utilitarianism

Christmas

Some numbers regarding international aid

Free Rice

FWD: Godless Short Stories

The T.O.E. and the Big Bang

A simple argument against the "one true religion" idea

Disagreement and Religious Belief, part 1

Sapient on locking Christians away

CNN Messes Up

Advanced

Anthony Flew - It doesn't really matter

Awkward

Look What Reared Its Ugly Head

Opinions

A Hiatus

Why Be Nice?

Justification

Reminiscence

Proving God

A Delicate Issue

Value-Laden Terms in Everyday Language

Colorado - Threats, and how to Respond

Categories

Trusting Others

Glenn Miller addresses ultimate motives

Insight into Faith

Rhetorical Analysis - Ultimate Words in the Abortion Dispute

Hugh Ross and Reasons to Believe

Forensics and evolutionary theory

Desire Utilitarianism

Introduction